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95-1853 CLINTON v. JONES
Litigation of private civil damages action against
incumbent president.
Ruling below (CA 8, 72 F.3d 1354, 64 LW
244 1):
Separation of powers doctrine confers absolute
immunity on president only for official acts, and
thus president is not immune from civil rights and
tort claims arising from acts that allegedly oc-
curred before he entered office; neither discovery
nor trial may be stayed except as necessary to
avoid interference with particularized, clearly ar-
ticulated presidential duties.
Questions presented: (1) Must litigation of pri-
vate civil damages action against incumbent
president in all but most exceptional cases be
deferred until president leaves office? (2) May
district court, as proper exercise of judicial discre-
tion, stay such litigation until president leaves
office?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/15/96, by Robert
S. Bennett, Carl S. Rauh, Alan Kriegel, Amy R.
Sabrin, Stephen P. Vaughn, and Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom, all of Washington, D.C.,
and David A. Strauss and Geoffrey R. Stone,
both of Chicago, Ill.
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Paula Corbin JONES, Plaintiff
V.
William Jefferson CLINTON and Danny Ferguson, Defendants.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS, WESTERN DIVISION
858 F. Supp. 902
July 21, 1994
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
... WRIGHT, District Judge
Plaintiff Paula Corbin Jones seeks civil damages from the President or the United States for actions that,
with one exception, are alleged to have occurred prior to his assuming office. The matter is before the Court
on motion of the President for permission to file a motion to dismiss on grounds of Presidential immunity
and to defer the filing of any other motions or pleadings until such time as the issue of immunity is resolved.
The plaintiff has responded in opposition to the motion. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the
President's motion should be and hereby is granted.
I.
This complaint, which was filed on May 6, 1994, arises out of an alleged incident that is said to have
occurred on May 8, 1991, when President Clinton was Governor of the State of Arkansas. The plaintiff was
a state employee at the time, and she claims that the President sexually harassed and assaulted her during a
conference being held at a hotel in Little Rock, Arkansas.
The plaintiff asserts four claims in her complaint against the President. In Counts I and II, she alleges
that President Clinton conspired to and did deprive her of her constitutional rights to equal protection and
due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, She contends that
the President discriminated against her because of her gender by sexually harassing and assaulting her, by
imposing a hostile work environment on her, and by causing her to fear that she would lose her job. She
further claims that she was subjected arbitrarily to the fear of losing her job or experiencing other adverse
actions in relation to her job and work environment. In Count III, plaintiff asserts a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress or outrage, and claims in Count IV that the President, through his press aides
and attorney, defamed her by denying the allegations that underlie this lawsuit.
The President informs the Court that he will file a motion to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to
its reinstatement after he leaves office, on grounds that sitting presidents are constitutionally immune from
having to litigate private suits for civil damages. He states that the immunity motion will raise serious issues
which go to the constitutionality of compelling a sitting President to litigate private civil damages claims, as
well as to this Court's authority to proceed in this case in the first instance. The President argues the Court
should allow him initially to assert the immunity issue alone, thereby permitting that question to be resolved
prior to filing any other pleadings in the case.
II.
The President states that his immunity motion will be based substantially on the Supreme Court's
decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, a case decided on a narrow 5-4 margin. The plaintiff in that case, a former
employee of the Department of the Air Force, had alleged that then-President Nixon abolished his position
in retaliation for his testimony before a Congressional Committee. The District Court rejected President
Nixon's claim of immunity, and the Court of Appeals dismissed his collateral appeal. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide the "important issue" of Presidential immunity. Referring to the plaintiffs claim
as "this merely private suit for damages," the Court held that "in view of the special nature of the President's
constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from
damages liability for acts within the 'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility." In so holding, the Court
identified immunity as "a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique office, rooted in the
constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history."
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Fitzgerald involved official actions by a sitting President while the allegations here relate to conduct
that purportedly occurred prior to President Clinton's assumption of office. The President acknowledges this
distinction and states that his motion will not assert absolute immunity such as was afforded in Fitzgerald,
but will recognize the plaintiffs right to reinstate the lawsuit after he leaves office. In asserting such a claim
of immunity, the President will seek entitlement to a fundamental protection from suit previously
unrecognized in any court. This claim may or may not succeed. Nevertheless, because of the "singular
importance of the Presidents duties," Fitzgerald, and because suits for civil damages "frequently could
distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his office but also
the nation that the Presidency was designed to serve," the Court concludes that the issue of presidential
immunity deserves threshold consideration, prior to the filing of any other motions or pleadings.
In allowing the President to first assert the issue of immunity, the Court is permitting a procedure that
is entirely consistent with the principles underlying absolute immunity. The "essence of absolute immunity
is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his [alleged] conduct in a civil damages action." "The
entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," and "it is effectively lost if a case
is erroneously permitted to go to trial." Because the entitlement is an immunity from suit, the Supreme Court
has stressed that immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage in litigation.
Moreover, the immunity that will be asserted in this case is of a unique character and does not require an
analysis of the allegations of the complaint. The Court thus has no need for dispositive motions at this time.
Were the President asserting a defense or qualified immunity, the Court might well agree with the plaintiff
that the substantive allegations of her complaint must be addressed. In such cases, courts are required to
determine whether the alleged actions violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known." To decide whether an official is protected by qualified immunity,
a court must determine whether the official's action was objectively legally reasonable in the light of the legal
rules that were clearly established at the time the action occurred. This inquiry involves a two-step process.
First, the court must determine as a threshold matter whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a
constitutional right. Second, the court must determine whether that constitutional right was clearly established
at the time that the officials acted.
The immunity that will be asserted by the President, however, is premised on his status as President and
does not require the Court to review the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Indeed, the allegations of the
complaint are irrelevant. This Court "need not consider the correctness of the plaintiffs version of the facts,
nor even determine whether the plaintiffs allegations actually state a claim. All it need determine is a
question of law."
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require every defendant, including
the President of the United States, to either answer a complaint or file a single dispositive motion raising all
available grounds for dismissal, including absolute immunity. Certainly, that is one way to handle a case, but
it is not the only way it can be done. Plaintiff asserts, however, that the briefing schedule sought by the
President is "nothing less than a categorical suspension of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." To the
contrary, Rule 12 specifically allows for successive motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. "Although
defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue and insufficiency of process are waived if
not raised in a party's first responsive pleading, 'A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.. .may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7(a), or by motion for judgment
on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits."' The briefing schedule sought by the President is in conformity
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and does not afford him privileges unavailable to other defendants.
To be sure, the plaintiffs interest in seeking prompt relief for the alleged violation of her rights is
certainly legitimate and not to be minimized. The Court, however, finds that plaintiffs concern that the
briefing schedule proposed by the President will entail undue delay is unfounded. Should the Court deny the
Presidents claim of immunity, such order would be immediately appealable. This would be so regardless of
the Court's ruling on any other Rule 12(b) motions.
Furthermore, it must be recognized that the relief plaintiff seeks is of a purely personal nature, the delay
of which will affect but a single individual who waited two days short of three years in which to file her
lawsuit. The President's claim to immunity from suits for civil damages, on the other hand, is equally
legitimate and may affect "not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was
designed to serve." Indeed, the amenability of a sitting President to suits for Civil damages raises significant
and important constitutional issues, the resolution of which will directly impact the institution of the
Presidency. That being so, and because the President's constitutional responsibilities and status require this
Court to exercise judicial deference and restraint, the Court finds that the President should be allowed to defer
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the filing of any other motions or pleadings until such time as the issue of immunity has been resolved by this
Court.
in.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will allow the President to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of presidential immunity on or before August 10, 1994, and to defer and preserve the filing of any other
motions or pleadings that may or must be filed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure until such time
as the issue of presidential immunity has been resolved by this Court.
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Paula Corbin JONES, Plaintiff
vs.
William Jefferson CLINTON and Danny Ferguson, Defendants.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
ARKANSAS, WESTERN DIVISION
869 F. Supp. 690
December 28, 1994
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WRIGHT, District Judge
The Plaintiff Paula Corbin Jones, filed a damage suit against the Defendants William Jefferson Clinton
and Danny Ferguson to recover for acts which were alleged to have taken place primarily while Defendant
Clinton was Governor of Arkansas and Defendant Ferguson was a Trooper with the Arkansas State Police
assigned to the Governor. Subsequently, in the General Election of November, 1992, Mr. Clinton was elected
President of the United States and assumed that office on January 20, 1993.
The complaint was filed on May 6, 1994, and was predicated on an alleged incident which was said to
have occurred on May 8, 1991. The action alleged sexual harassment and conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983 and 1985, which are provisions included in civil rights legislation of the reconstruction era. It also
alleged state law claims of defamation and outrage....
Defendant Clinton responded with a motion to bifurcate the briefing schedule so as to permit the
question of Presidential immunity to be argued on a motion to dismiss before any other questions were
presented. On July 21, 1994, the Court entered a Memorandum and Order allowing President Clinton to file
a motion to dismiss on the basis of Presidential immunity and deferring and preserving the filing of any other
motions or pleadings until the issue of Presidential immunity had been resolved. The Court noted that this
order was purely procedural in nature and addressed only the question of whether Presidential immunity
would be considered as a threshold issue.
The basic issue, therefore, which this Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses is whether a civil
action may be asserted against the President of the United States while he is in office when the fact situation
alleged in the complaint arose before his election and assumption of office.
I. Absolute Immunity of the President from Civil Suit
The President has asserted that he may not be sued in a civil action while sitting as President, even when
the facts asserted by the Plaintiff occurred, if at all, before he was elected or assumed the office. This, of
course, is a claim of absolute immunity. The President would have the Court dismiss the complaint while
preserving through some equitable tolling of the statute of limitations the right of Ms. Jones to sue him civilly
as soon as he left office. . .. Ms. Jones argued against immunity, but also argued alternatively for dismissal
with an automatic reinstatement on the Court's docket on the last day of his Presidency and against a stay.
All briefs discussed at some length the intent of the framers of the Constitution and interpretations of various
scholars and judges relating to this subject...
A. The English Legacy
The Court believes that the place to begin this discussion, before coming to the vital question of
constitutional interpretation, is in English law and the development of the rights and liberties of the English
people .... .The Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the states contain provisions that
come directly from that source....
Almost all of the states adopted "reception statutes" receiving into state law the English common law
and acts of Parliament as they existed as of a certain date.. . except to the extent that they were contrary to
our federal or state constitutions or statutes or were contrary to our form of government. Arkansas adopted
such a statute shortly after becoming a state. The statute adopted the English common law, subject to the
stated limitations, as it existed prior to the fourth year of James I. Various English statutes or common law
rules passed into Arkansas law as a result. Also received were those portions of the Magna Carta relating
to due process of law, equal protection, trial by jury, and rights unrelated to the feudal system.
The Magna Carta was largely a restatement of feudal law pertaining to land tenures and their incidents,
and thus most of it has no application here. However, in addition to enshrining in English law some of our
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basic rights and liberties, it constituted a series of limitations placed upon the King and his authority. There
would follow in English history a long and bloody struggle to define the rights of the monarchy as opposed
to Parliament and the citizenry and also to the common law itself.
The tension between the King and Parliament, on the one hand, and the King and the common law, on
the other, reached its heights with the ascension to the throne of the Stuart monarchy in the person of King
James the First.. . . Friction soon arose between the King and the House of Commons. At the root of the
disagreement, once again, was the Magna Carta.
An important participant in all of this was Sir Edward Coke, whose writings had an enormous influence
on English and American law, and who had served as Solicitor General and later Attorney General under
Queen Elizabeth I and also as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas. He subsequently would become
Chief Justice of the King's Bench under King James I.-Under Elizabeth, as her attorney, Coke had been a
staunch defender of the Crown, but as a judge, he would quote Bracton to King James: "The King ought to
be under no man, but under God and the law."
None of this and other frictions set well with the King, and Coke was dismissed from the bench, turning
his efforts to Parliament. The continuing friction between Parliament and James' successor, King Charles I,
ultimately led to the adoption of the Petition of Right, which in essence ratified and extended the Magna
Carta, and in effect further limited the prerogatives of the Crown. A defining moment came when the House
of Commons rejected a proposal of the House of Lords that would add a clause recognizing the sovereignty
of the King....
The Petition of Right was one of the foundation stones of the English Constitution. It enlarged upon the
Magna Carta as a constitutional limitation upon the power of the monarchy. It made it apparent that the
King's prerogative was limited. Sub Deo et Lege was the law of the land.
B. The American Experience
In the formulation of Article II of the Constitution, there were varying viewpoints as to the office of the
President. ... What resulted was the compromise that we have today, amended only slightly from the
original. It sets out the powers and duties of the Executive Branch . .. but it does not address the immunity
question.
A large part of the problem, aside from the silence of the Constitution, is that for all practical purposes,
the Executive Branch, unlike the Congress and the Supreme Court, consists of only one person. His
administrative appointees serve at his pleasure. Thus, a large part of the President's assertion may be
summarized in the proposition that, without immunity, to cripple the Presidency in one way or another in civil
litigation is to deliver a blow to and weaken the effectiveness of the entire Executive Branch of government
which in effect is only one person, the President....
The President and his lawyers, in arguing the immunity issue, seem to place substantial reliance on the
intention of the framers of the Constitution. Much of what they argue relates to the impeachment process.
For example, they seize in their brief upon this commentary by Hamilton from The Federalist No. 69: "The
President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason,
bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to
prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of the law." Of course, Hamilton was talking about
impeachment under Article II, Section 4, under which the President may be "removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." That has
nothing to do with immunity from civil suit. Article II, and Hamilton, were addressing criminal conduct on
the part of the President.
This is not to say, however, that the question of Presidential immunity from suit was not discussed at the
Constitutional Convention or during the years immediately following....
But just as the English law moved from the divine right of kings assertion to the assertion of Lord Coke
and Parliament that the King was under God and the law, the situation in American law prior to [Nixon v.]
Fitzgerald had proceeded essentially in the same direction with regard to the office of President....
The disagreement over Presidential immunity at the Constitutional Convention carried over into the
years that followed. Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that a subpoena duces tecum could be issued to
President Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson protested strongly, arguing that the three branches of government had
to be independent of each other, including independence by the executive from the judiciary. ... [The
argument of total independence of the Executive Branch from judicial action had been settled in large part
by Marbury v. Madison. While not bearing upon the immunity question directly, it was apparent that the
Executive Branch was not immune from action by the Judicial Branch in enforcing mandates of the
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Constitution. In fact, Chief Justice Marshall said ofMarbury's rights and remedies: "The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury."
[I]n Mississippi v. Johnson, the Supreme Court refused to enjoin President Andrew Johnson from
enforcing the Reconstruction Acts. Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, writing for a unanimous Court, declined
to enjoin enforcement of the legislation even though it was allegedly unconstitutional. He distinguished
Marbury by stating that it only related to ministerial duties involving no discretion while these Acts related
to "executive and political" duties involving broad discretion. To enjoin the President would be to restrain
him from carrying out his constitutional responsibility to execute the laws. Enjoining him would threaten the
separation of powers between the branches and the independence of the President.
Of course, the complaint of Paula Corbin -Jones in-this civil case relates neither to the ministerial nor the
executive duties of the President. The allegations relate to alleged conduct of the President while he was
Governor of Arkansas. (The allegations, it might be noted, also do not relate to any ministerial or executive
duty of the Office of Governor.) The Justice Department, in its brief, stated that it knew of only three private
suits based on pre-presidential conduct which had been adjudicated during the President's term in office.
These three were (1) an action against Theodore Roosevelt and the Board of Police in New York City, which
was resolved in the Board's favor in 1904; (2) A damage suit against Harry Truman based upon his conduct
as a county judge in 1931, resolved in Truman's favor in 1946; and (3) a suit against John F. Kennedy in
California Superior Court asserting a tort claim from an automobile accident occurring during the 1960
campaign, which was ultimately settled.
However, the case most applicable to this one is Nixon v. Fitzgerald. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme
Court decided that President Nixon had absolute immunity from a suit brought by A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a
management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, whom the President ordered fired because he had
given congressional testimony on cost overruns which embarrassed his superiors in the Department of
Defense (and presumably embarrassed the President also). Fitzgerald sued for damages. The district court
rejected President Nixon's assertion of Presidential immunity. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the President had absolute immunity from a civil suit for damages resulting from
official actions taken by the President while in office. The majority opinion of Justice Lewis Powell was hotly
disputed in a dissent by Justice Byron White, in which Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall joined. The
majority opinion was in accord with the view of the scholar, Edward S. Corwin, in discussing the President's
immunity from judicial process.
But the facts of Fitzgerald, as stated previously, are not the same as those in this case. Mr. Nixon was
President when he fired Mr. Fitzgerald and was acting in his capacity as the head of the Executive Branch.
Mr. Clinton was not President and was not even the President-elect when the alleged cause of action arose
in this case.
The Constitution, of course, is silent on all of this. The framers debated even the subject of whether the
President should be subject to impeachment for criminal acts and, if so, who should conduct the trial. There
is nothing in the document relating to civil actions. Justice Story, was of the mind that the President
possessed immunity from civil suit, and the Supreme Court in Fitzgerald agreed in a severely divided opinion
that the President was civilly immune from suits brought for official actions taken while in office.
Thus, the hard fact is that these issues of immunity, whether absolute or qualified, have been left in the
hands of the Judicial Branch, particularly the Supreme Court. This District Court is not activist in nature and
is not inclined to "make law" where none exists. As stated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison, however "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."
This Court recognizes the reasoning of Justice Powell and his thin majority in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that
the President has absolute immunity from civil damage actions arising out of the execution of official duties
of office. However, this Court does not believe that a President has absolute immunity from civil causes of
action arising prior to assuming the office. Nowhere in the Constitution, congressional acts, or the writings
of any judge or scholar, may any credible support for such a proposition be found. It is contrary to our form
of government, which asserts as did the English in the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right, that even the
sovereign is subject to God and the law.
Therefore, the Presidents Motion to Dismiss on Grounds of Presidential Immunity is denied.
U. Limited or Temporary Immunity from Trial
The question does not end here, however, because the intent of the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald
would seem to carry this case beyond the question of absolute immunity from civil suit. The language of the
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majority opinion by Justice Powell is sweeping and quite firm in the view that to disturb the President with
defending civil litigation that does not demand immediate attention under the circumstances would be to
interfere with the conduct of the duties of the office.
Justice Powell states unequivocally the following: "Because of the singular importance of the President's
duties, diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective
functioning of government." He adds:
In view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would
be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages. Cognizance of this personal vulnerability
frequently could distract a President from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and
his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was designed to serve.
Chief Justice Burger expressed the same theme in his concurring opinion' "Exposing a President to civil
damages actions for official acts within the scope of the Executive authority would inevitably subject
Presidential actions to undue judicial scrutiny as well as subject the President to harassment."
Of course, in the preceding part of this opinion, this Court has pointed out that President Clinton's
alleged acts took place before he was President and that he was not acting in the scope of Executive authority.
Nonetheless, the concerns expressed by a majority of the Supreme Court are not lessened by the fact that
these alleged actions preceded his Presidency, nor by the fact that his alleged actions would not have been
within his official governmental capacity anyway. The problem, still, is essentially the same - the necessity
to avoid litigation, which also might blossom through other unrelated civil actions, and which could
conceivably harper the President in conducting the duties of his office. This situation could have hannful
effects in connection not only with the President but also with the nation in general.
It is therefore the view of this Court that although President Clinton is not entitled to have this action
dismissed on the basis of immunity, he should not have to devote his time and effort to the defense of this
case at trial while in office.
This is not a case in which any necessity exists to rush to trial. ...
The situation here is that the Plaintiff filed this action two days before the three-year statute of limitations
expired. Obviously, Plaintiff Jones was in no rush to get her case to court and, in fact, has stated publicly and
in her brief that her lawsuit came about in an effort to clear her name of allegations of sexual activity
involving then-Governor Clinton. Her complaint discusses in detail this situation and indicates that suit was
brought because of the use of the name "Paula" in an article appearing in The American Spectator, in which
the author purportedly obtained his information from state troopers, including Defendant Ferguson.
Consequently, the possibility that Ms. Jones may obtain a judgment and damages in this matter does not
appear to be of urgent nature for her, and a delay in trial of the case will not harm her right to recover or cause
her undue inconvenience. For want of better phraseology, this amounts to the granting of temporary or limited
immunity from trial as Fitzgerald seems to require due to the fact that the primary defendant is the President.
The Court believes that such ruling is also permitted under Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allowing district courts to place matters upon the trial calendar "as the courts deem expedient." Further, such
limited immunity from trial would seem to be justified under the equity powers of the Court.
By putting the case on hold, as far as trial is concerned, the Court avoids any tolling of the statute of
limitations problems which might otherwise be presented if the case were dismissed without prejudice.
Despite the fact that the President considers himself estopped to object to a refiling, the Court believes that
a delay of the trial is the better way to proceed.
This does not mean, however, that the case is put on the shelf for all purposes. There would seem to be
no reason why the discovery and deposition process could not proceed as to all persons including the
President himself. This approach eliminates the problem that witnesses may die, disappear, become
incapacitated, or become forgetful due to the passage of time....
M. Conclusion
The Court has attempted to follow its understanding of Nixon v. Fitzgerald and other cases as well as
to adhere to the historical framework involved. Most importantly, the Court has sought to give effect to the
full meaning of the separation of powers doctrine originally enunciated by Montesquieu and implicit in the
founding fathers' structure of the Constitution....
On the other hand, in situations in which the President was not the holder of his office when the action
allegedly arose, there would seem to be no immunity against civil litigation. The rights of Plaintiff Jones as
an American citizen must be protected. Sub Deo et lege is our law as well as the law of Great Britain. No
one, be he King or President, is above the law.
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To protect the Office of President, however, from the potential harm that could result from unfettered
civil litigation, and to give effect to the policy of separation of powers, it is necessary to provide that the
President cannot be tried in the context presented here until he leaves office.... By permitting discovery as
to all including the President, the Court is laying the groundwork for a trial shortly after the President leaves
office....
Finally, the Court must express its awareness that this case is one in which new law is being made. All
of the references to historical events and to other cases do not change that fact. In making such a ruling, the
Court is also not unmindful of the fact that to this extent the separation of powers has been breached. But
it has happened before in many cases including United States v. Nixon, and many of the landmark decisions
of Chief Justice John Marshall. In the end, the decision must be made by the courts when there is doubt and
only limited precedent.
As previously noted, it "is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." United States v. Nixon reaffirmed that statement: "We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and
duty of this Court 'to say what the law is' with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case." That
is what this Court has tried to do, keeping in mind the words of Chief Justice John Marshall that "we must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding" and that it is intended to endure for generations and
to be applied to the various crises of human affairs.
The President's motion seeking immunity from suit is denied. The court will issue a scheduling order in
due course.
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Paula Corbin JONES, Plaintiff
vs.
William Jefferson CLINTON and Danny Ferguson, Defendants
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS, WESTERN DIVISION
879 F. Supp. 86
February 24, 1995
... Wright, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
On December 28, 1994, this Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying the motion of
Defendant William Jefferson Clinton to dismiss on the grounds of presidential immunity. The Court found,
however, that trial of the entire matter should be delayed until after President Clinton leaves office. In spite
of ordering a delay in setting the case for trial, the Court found that discovery could proceed as to all persons,
including the President.
Both sides have appealed the Court's Order, and President Clinton has filed a Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal. Plaintiff has responded in opposition to the motion, and the President has filed a reply to Plaintiffs
response. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion for stay.
I.
The denial of the President's motion to dismiss on the grounds of presidential immunity constitutes a
"final" order that is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. An appeal from a denial of official
immunity requires a stay of all proceedings pending resolution of the appeal. As stated in Johnson v. Hay,
upon the filing of a notice of appeal in an immunity case, "jurisdiction has been vested in the court of appeals
and the district court should not act further." Thus, this Court no longer has jurisdiction over those aspects
of the case involved in the President's appeal to the Eighth Circuit.
The parties agree and there is no question that the Court is required to stay discovery against the
President pending appeal. There is, however, a separate defendant in this case, Arkansas State Trooper
Danny Ferguson, who has filed an answer to the complaint and has nothing to appeal. The President moves
the Court to stay all proceedings against Ferguson as well, arguing that the issue of whether the case should
go forward against Ferguson is one of the "'aspects of the case involved in the appeal."'
Plaintiff responds that while the effect of the President's appeal is to halt proceedings related to him,
there is no reason or right to stop the case as it relates to Ferguson. Plaintiff contends that just as immune
and non-immune claims arising in the same lawsuit may proceed on separate tracks, so too may immune and
non-immune defendants proceed separately. Plaintiff also urges that the President has two roles in this case,
one as a defendant and another as a witness. Even though all proceedings against him in his role as defendant
may be stayed pending appeal, Plaintiff asserts the President may still be subject to discovery on other claims
as a witness.
II.
The Court rejects the President's attempt to, in effect, claim immunity on behalf of Ferguson, who has
advanced no such right. The President's argument goes beyond any authority this Court has been able to find.
The Court is unwilling to extend the effects of the President's immunity to Ferguson and finds that it retains
jurisdiction over the case as to the Plaintiffs claims against him.
While the Court is not convinced by the President's argument that Plaintiffs claims against Ferguson are
part of the aspects of the appeal, it will, nevertheless, grant President Clinton's motion to stay all proceedings
in this case pending the appeal for another reason.
The Court cannot imagine how proceedings can go forward against Ferguson without the heavy
involvement of the President through his attorneys. The claims are so inextricably intertwined that in order
to protect the President to the full extent that his claim of immunity would provide, the Court finds that the
motion should be granted. The pragmatic fact is that if discovery were allowed to proceed against Ferguson,
he could only testify to action on his part, and other deponents would have to limit their testimony to
Ferguson. Trooper Ferguson's testimony is among the most important in this case, but if he could not testify
as to then-Governor Clinton's instructions to him, if any, and to the Governor's involvement in this matter,
if any, and to what the Governor told him, if anything, then his testimony would be a hollow shell. Trooper
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Ferguson is a defendant, but the case revolves around the alleged actions of then-Governor Clinton, the
central figure in this action.
II.
The Court is concerned about the possibility that some discovery may be necessary to preserve
documentary evidence in this case, such as business records of the Excelsior Hotel and records of state
agencies. The President recognizes Plaintiffs concern that evidence may be lost, and suggests that they may
be able to cooperate to obtain informal discovery or, if the need is disputed, the aggrieved party could apply
to the Court of Appeals for permission to take limited discovery. This appears to be the only solution to this
potential problem. Therefore, the Court encourages the parties to cooperate to preserve specific items of
evidence that may be lost due to the passage of time.
IV.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Stay Pending Appeal is hereby granted.
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BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.
We have before us in this appeal the novel question whether the person currently serving as President
of the United States is entitled to immunity from civil liability for his unofficial acts, i.e., for acts committed
by him in his personal capacity rather than in his capacity as President. William Jefferson Clinton, who here
is sued personally, and not as President, appeals from the District Court's decision staying trial proceedings,
for the duration of his presidency, on claims brought against him by Paula Corbin Jones. He argues that the
court instead should have dismissed Mrs. Jones's suit without prejudice to the refiling of her suit when he no
longer is President. Mr. Clinton also challenges the District Court's decision to allow discovery to proceed
in the case during the stay of the trial. Mrs. Jones cross-appeals, seeking to have the stays entered by the
District Court lifted, so that she might proceed to trial on her claims. We affirm in part and reverse in part,
and remand to the District Court.
On May 6, 1994, Mrs. Jones filed suit in the District Court against Mr. Clinton and Danny Ferguson,
an Arkansas State Trooper who was assigned to Mr. Clinton's security detail during his tenure as governor
of Arkansas, for actions alleged to have occurred beginning with an incident in a Little Rock, Arkansas, hotel
suite on May 8, 1991, when Mr. Clinton was governor and Mrs. Jones was a state employee. Pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mrs. Jones alleges that Mr. Clinton, under color of state law, violated her constitutional
rights to equal protection and due process by sexually harassing and assaulting her. She further alleges that
Mr. Clinton and Trooper Ferguson conspired to violate those rights, a claim she brings under 42 U.S.C. §
1985. Her complaint also includes two supplemental state law claims, one against Mr. Clinton for intentional
infliction of emotional distress and the other against both Mr. Clinton and Trooper Ferguson for defamation.
Mr. Clinton, asserting a claim of immunity from civil suit, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
without prejudice to its refiling when he is no longer President or, in the alternative, for a stay of the
proceedings for so long as he is President. On December 28, 1994, the District Court, rejecting the
application of absolute immunity, denied Mr. Clinton's motion to dismiss the complaint. The court did find,
however, that for separation of powers reasons Mr. Clinton was entitled to a "temporary or limited immunity
from trial," and thus granted his request to stay the trial for the duration of Mr. Clinton's service as President.
Concluding that the claims against Trooper Ferguson are factually and legally intertwined with the claims
against Mr. Clinton, the court also stayed the trial against Trooper Ferguson for as long as Mr. Clinton is
President, but permitted discovery on Mrs. Jones's claims against both Mr. Clinton and Trooper Ferguson
to go forward. On appeal, Mr. Clinton seeks reversal of the District Court's rejection of his motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of presidential immunity and asks us to order that court to dismiss Mrs. Jones's
action in its entirety, without prejudice. In the alternative, he asks this Court to reverse the decision denying
his motion to stay discovery. Mrs. Jones cross-appeals the District Court's decision to stay the trial of her
claims against both Mr. Clinton and Trooper Ferguson.
Mr. Clinton argues that this suit should be dismissed solely because of his status as President. The
immunity he seeks would protect him for as long as he is President, but would expire when his presidency
has been completed. The question before us, then, is whether the President is entitled to immunity, for as long
as he is President, from civil suits alleging actionable behavior by him in his private capacity rather than in
his official capacity as President. We hold that he is not.
We start with the truism that Article II of the Constitution, which vests the executive power of the federal
government in the President, did not create a monarchy. The President is cloaked with none of the attributes
of sovereign immunity. To the contrary, the President, like all other government officials, is subject to the
same laws that apply to all other members of our society. As the Supreme Court has observed, "Our system
of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever their position in government, are
subject to federal law. . ." Nevertheless, mindful that for the sake of the nation's general good the
Constitution empowers officials to act within the scope of their official responsibilities, the Supreme Court
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has recognized "that there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability"
for their performance of official acts. The list of those entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability
includes the President of the United States for his official acts; members of Congress for their legislative
acts, regardless of motive, under the Speech and Debate Clause; judges in courts of general jurisdiction for
judicial acts; prosecutors for prosecutorial functions; and certain executive officials performing certain
judicial and prosecutorial functions in their official capacities. In addition, witnesses are entitled to absolute
immunity from civil suit for testimony given in judicial proceedings, and even government officials whose
special functions do not require a full exemption from liability may have a more limited qualified immunity
for their official acts. We are unaware, however, of any case in which any public official ever has been
granted any immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and neither the Supreme Court nor any other court,
the District Court excepted, appears to have addressed the precise issue before us today: whether the
President is entitled to immunity for the duration of his presidency when sued for his unofficial actions.
The immunity that has been found for official acts is not the product of a prudential doctrine created by
the courts and is not to be granted as a matter of judicial largesse. Rather, the question whether to grant
immunity to a government official is "guided by the Constitution, federal statutes, and history" and is
informed by public policy. "In the case of the President the inquiries into history and policy . .. tend to
converge. Because the Presidency did not exist through most of the development of common law, any
historical analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional heritage and structure." Thus
the historical "inquiry involves policies and principles that may be considered implicit in the nature of the
President's office in a system structured to achieve effective government under a constitutionally mandated
separation of powers."
There is no suggestion in this case that federal legislation is the source of either the immunity Mr. Clinton
seeks or an abrogation of a previously declared presidential immunity. Nor is presidential immunity of any
kind explicit in the text of the Constitution. Instead, whatever immunity the President enjoys flows by
implication from the separation of powers doctrine, which itself is not mentioned in the Constitution, but is
reflected in the division of powers among the three branches. The Supreme Court in Fitzgerald, after an
exhaustive examination of the history and the constitutional significance of the presidency, held that absolute
immunity from civil liability for official acts is "a functionally mandated incident of the President's unique
office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and supported by our history." There
is a "special solicitude due to claims alleging a threatened breach of essential Presidential prerogatives under
the separation of powers."
The parties agree, and so do we, that the fundamental authority on the subject of presidential immunity
is the plurality opinion in Fitzgerald. As noted above, the issue before the Court in that case was whether
the President is entitled to absolute immunity (rather than qualified immunity or no immunity at all) from
personal civil liability for his official acts. By only a five- to-four majority, the Court held that, "[i]n view
of the special nature of the Presidents constitutional office and functions, we think it appropriate to recognize
absolute Presidential immunity from damages liability for acts within the 'outer perimeter' of his official
responsibility." By definition, unofficial acts are not within the perimeter of the President's official
responsibility at all, even the outer perimeter. The Court's struggle in Fitzgerald to establish presidential
immunity for acts within the outer perimeter of official responsibility belies the notion, here advanced by Mr.
Clinton, that beyond this outer perimeter there is still more immunity waiting to be discovered. We thus are
unable to read Fitzgerald as support for the proposition that the separation of powers doctrine provides
immunity for the individual who serves as President from lawsuits seeking to hold him accountable for his
unofficial actions. Moreover, having considered the arguments put forward in the present case, we cannot
discern any reason grounded in the Constitution for extending presidential immunity beyond the outer
perimeter delineated in Fitzgerald. Accordingly, we hold that a sitting President is not immune from suit for
his unofficial acts. In this case it is undisputed that most of the acts alleged by Mrs. Jones clearly fall outside
the zone of official presidential responsibility, given that they occurred while Mr. Clinton was still governor
of Arkansas.
Stressing that the immunity claimed here is only temporary (until the end of Mr. Clinton's presidency),
Mr. Clinton and his anici would have us consider the nature of Mrs. Jones's complaint, as well as the timing
of the filing of her suit (apparently just within the statute of limitations), and conclude that her suit is neither
important nor urgent, and certainly not consequential enough to trump Mr. Clinton's claim to temporal
immunity from suit. But that is not the test. Mrs. Jones is constitutionally entitled to access to the courts
and to the equal protection of the laws. "The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Mrs. Jones retains that
right in her suit against Mr. Clinton, regardless of what her claims may be or when her suit was filed (if
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otherwise timely filed), provided that she is not challenging actions that fall within the ambit of official
presidential responsibility. We further reject the suggestion that Mrs. Jones's motives in filing suit, alleged
to be political, should be examined, and that her suit should be dismissed if we are persuaded that her
objective in bringing the suit is less than pure. Such an approach would convert a presidential immunity
analysis into the taking and weighing of accusations and recriminations, an exercise unnecessary and
inappropriate to the proper determination of a claim of immunity based on the Constitution.
Mr. Clinton argues that, if he is presently amenable to suit for his private acts, the proceedings against
him inevitably will intrude upon the office of President, in contravention of Fitzgerald's teachings, noting
the Court's concern that the "diversion of [the President's] energies by concern with private lawsuits would
raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government." Thus, Mr. Clinton would have us ignore the
line that Fitzgerald draws between official and unofficial acts and instead "balance the constitutional weight
of the interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive
Branch," the analysis undertaken by the Court in reaching its decision on the question of presidential
immunity for official acts. But the Court in Fitzgerald was troubled by the potential impact of private civil
suits arising out of the President's performance of his official duties on the future performance of those
duties, not by whether the President qua individual citizen would have the time to be a defendant in a lawsuit.
As the Court explained, "[A] President must concern himself with matters likely to 'arouse the most intense
feelings,' " and "it is in precisely such cases that there exists the greatest public interest in providing an
official 'the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with' the duties of his office." It is clear from
a careful reading of Fitzgerald that the justification for the absolute immunity conferred in that case was
concern that the Presidents awareness of his essentially infinite potential personal liability for virtually every
official action he takes would have an adverse influence on the presidential decision-making process. The
rationale of the Fitzgerald majority is that, without protection from civil liability for his official acts, the
President would make (or refrain from making) official decisions, not in the best interests of the nation, but
in an effort to avoid lawsuits and personal liability. This rationale is inapposite where only personal, private
conduct by a President is at issue.
Mrs. Jones's claims, except for her defamation claim, concern actions by Mr. Clinton that, beyond cavil,
are unrelated to his duties as President. This lawsuit thus does not implicate presidential decision- making.
If this suit goes forward, the President still will be able to carry out his duties without any concern that he
might be sued for damages by a constituent aggrieved by some official presidential act. Though amenable
to suit for his private acts, the President retains the absolute immunity found in Fitzgerald for official acts,
and presidential decision-making will not be impaired. "In defining the scope of an official's absolute
privilege, . . . the sphere of protected action must be related closely to the immunity's justifying purposes."
We see no connection, much less a close one, between the unofficial actions Mr. Clinton wishes to shield
from judicial process and the justifying purposes of presidential immunity as set forth by the Court in
Fitzgerald.
Mr. Clinton argues that denying his claim to immunity will give the judiciary carte blanche to intrude
unconstitutionally upon the Executive Branch and in fact will disrupt the performance of his presidential
duties and responsibilities. As the argument goes, because a federal court will control the litigation, the Third
Branch necessarily will interfere with the Executive Branch through the court's scheduling orders and its
powers to issue contempt citations and sanctions. But Mr. Clinton's sweeping claim that this suit will allow
the judiciary to interfere with the constitutionally assigned duties of the Executive Branch, and thus will
violate the constitutional separation of powers doctrine if immunity is not granted, without detailing any
specific responsibilities or explaining how or the degree to which they are affected by the suit (and, unlike
the dissent, post at 1369, 1370 we think it is Mr. Clinton's burden to do so), is insufficient ground for
granting presidential immunity, even temporarily. We reject Mr. Clinton's argument, and instead focus our
attention on the true separation of powers issues, which we already have discussed, upon which the question
of presidential immunity hinges.
"[he Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each of [the] three essential branches
of Government." Under the checks and balances provided for in the Constitution, all branches have the
capacity to intrude in some way upon the province of the other branches. But under the Constitution, and
because of those same checks and balances, no one branch may intrude upon another to such an extent that
the threatened branch is rendered incapable of performing its constitutionally assigned duties. What is
needed, we believe, to avoid a separation of powers problem is not immunity from suit for unofficial actions,
an immunity that would accord the President a degree of protection from suit for his private wrongs enjoyed
by no other public official (much less ordinary citizens), but judicial case management sensitive to the
burdens of the presidency and the demands of the President's schedule. The trial court has broad discretion
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to control the scheduling of events in matters on its docket. We have every confidence that the District Court
will exercise its discretion in such a way that this lawsuit may move forward with the reasonable dispatch
that is desirable in all cases, without creating scheduling conflicts that would thwart the Presidents
performance of his official duties.
The unfettered filing of numerous vexatious or frivolous civil lawsuits against sitting Presidents for their
unofficial acts that Mr. Clinton and the dissenting opinion in this case envision if Mr. Clinton is not granted
temporal immunity from Mrs. Jones's lawsuit is not only speculative, but historically unsupported. To date
no court ever has held that an incumbent President has any immunity from suit for his unofficial actions.
Although our Presidents never have been recognized as having any immunity from lawsuits seeking remedies
for civil liabilities allegedly incurred by them in their personal dealings, it would appear that few such
lawsuits have been filed.
While the President himself and his official conduct inevitably have the high visibility that concerned the
Court in Fitzgerald, his unofficial, private conduct is on a different footing. Although such conduct may
attract widespread attention when someone elects to make it public, the unofficial acts of the person who
serves as President, unlike the President's official acts, are not likely to affect "countless people." Rather,
unofficial conduct will affect only those who traffic with the President in his personal capacity. Thus the
universe of potential plaintiffs who might seek to hold the President accountable for his alleged private
wrongs via a civil lawsuit is considerably smaller than the universe of potential plaintiffs who might seek to
hold the President accountable for his official conduct; in the latter case, the plaintiff could be virtually
anyone who feels aggrieved by presidential action. If, contrary to history and all reasonable expectations,
a President ever becomes so burdened by private-wrong lawsuits that his attention to them would hinder him
in carrying out the duties of his office, then clearly the courts would be duty-bound to exercise their discretion
to control scheduling and the like so as to protect the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional
responsibilities. Frivolous claims, a category with which the courts are quite familiar, generally can be
handled expeditiously and ordinarily can be terminated with little or no involvement by the person sued.
Finally, we reject the notion that presidential immunity in civil cases seeking a remedy for unofficial acts
can be conferred on an ad hoc basis. There is no constitutional basis for the proposition that a court, in its
discretion, could refuse to grant immunity to a President in, for example, suits for arrearages in child support
or the case of the "more urgent need" of a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief, or of a plaintiff who shows
exigent circumstances, while granting immunity from suits for declaratory relief or money damages where
the plaintiff demonstrates no exigency. A sitting President is either entitled to immunity from suit for his
unofficial acts, or he is not. As we have noted, presidential immunity is not a prudential doctrine fashioned
by the courts. Mr. Clinton is entitled to immunity, if at all, only because the Constitution ordains it.
Presidential immunity thus cannot be granted or denied by the courts as an exercise of discretion. The
discretion of the courts in suits such as this one comes into play, not in deciding on a case-by-case basis
whether a civil complaint alleging private wrongs is sufficiently compelling so as to be permitted to proceed
with an incumbent President as defendant, but in controlling the scheduling of the case as necessary to avoid
interference with specific, particularized, clearly articulated presidential duties. If the trial preliminaries or
the trial itself become barriers to the effective performance of his official duties, Mr. Clinton's remedy is to
pursue motions for rescheduling, additional time, or continuances. Again, we have every confidence that the
District Court will discharge its responsibility to protect the Presidents role as our government's chief
executive officer, without impeding Mrs. Jones's right to have her claims heard without undue delay. If either
party believes the court is failing to discharge that responsibility, the proper course is to petition this Court
for a writ of mandamus or prohibition.
To sum up, we hold that the Constitution does not confer upon an incumbent President any immunity
from civil actions that arise from his unofficial acts. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's decision
denying Mr. Clinton's motion to dismiss Mrs. Jones's suit and the decision to allow discovery in this case to
proceed. For the same reason, we reverse the District Court's order granting Mr. Clinton's motion to stay the
trial of this matter for the duration of his presidency. Mrs. Jones's appeal of the District Court's
post-judgment order staying discovery during the pendency of this appeal is dismissed as moot, as is Mr.
Clinton's challenge to our jurisdiction to hear that appeal. The case is remanded to the District Court, with
instructions to lift the stays that the court has entered and to allow Mrs. Jones's suit against Mr. Clinton and
Trooper Ferguson to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
BEAM, Circuit Judge, concurring specially.
I concur in the conclusions reached by Judge Bowman. I write separately to express my views on three
matters which are, in my mind, insufficiently discussed by either the opinion of the court or the dissent.
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I.
Mr. Clinton and his amicus vigorously present their position on the potential impact of this civil litigation
on the office and the duties of the presidency. And, without question, they raise matters of substantial
concern given the constitutional obligations of the office. What is missing from their arguments is a
coordinated and balanced analysis of the impact a stay of the litigation, including an embargo on all
discovery, will have on Ms. Jones and her claims. This should also be of substantial concern because it
involves fundamental constitutional rights governing access to and use of the judicial process under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments and the right to a timely jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, to identify
only a few specific omissions.
It is incorrect, in my view, for Mr. Clinton and his amicus to assert that the delay is of no consequence
to Ms. Jones. Aside from the adage that justice delayed is justice denied, Ms. Jones faces real dangers of loss
of evidence through the unforeseeable calamities inevitable with the passage of time. To argue that this
problem may be dealt with by episodic exceptions when the risk of loss is apparent is to miss the point. Only
rarely does life proceed in such a foreseeable fashion.
The dissent states, "[w]here there is no urgency to pursue a suit for civil damages, the proper course is
to avoid opportunities for breaching separation of powers altogether by holding the litigation in abeyance
until a President leaves office." The dissent urges total abeyance of both discovery and trial. I perceive this,
perhaps incorrectly, to be an implicit finding that there is, indeed, no real urgency to Ms. Jones's suit for civil
damages and, thus, the constitutionally based separation of powers doctrine demands that this litigation, in
all of its manifestations, be abated until Mr. Clinton leaves office--this to protect the constitutional grant of
executive authority given to a sitting President. In my view, this greatly oversimplifies the issues in this
appeal and overstates the danger to the presidency. The potential for prejudice to Ms. Jones, as earlier noted,
reaches, or at least approaches, constitutional magnitude. If a blanket stay is granted and discovery is
precluded as suggested by Mr. Clinton and his amicus, Ms. Jones will have no way that I know of (and none
has been advanced by those counseling this course of action), to perpetuate the testimony of any party or
witness should they die or become incompetent during the period the matter is held in abeyance. Should the
death or incompetence of a key witness occur, proving the elements of Ms. Jones's alleged causes of action
will become impossible. Thus, her "chose in action" would be obliterated, or at least substantially damaged
if she is denied reasonable and timely access to the workings of the federal tribunal.
It is true that some of Ms. Jones's claims would survive to her guardian, heirs or assigns in the event of
her incompetence or death, assuming a way is found to preserve crucial evidence. Her claim of defamation
is in a different class. It almost certainly would be totally extinguished should either party die. This would
also include her defamation claims asserted against Trooper Ferguson.
From the pleadings, the forum law applicable to her defamation claims is not easily discernible and I
have not canvassed the law in every conceivable jurisdiction. It seems appropriate to note, however, that
under Arkansas law, for example, the defamation claims would expire on the death of either party. I think
Arkansas expresses the rule of mostjurisdictions. Accordingly, one can readily see the irreparable harm that
a stay of this claim (assuming its viability as we must at this point) will bring to Ms. Jones. Thus, the total
stay requested by Mr. Clinton and his amicus, and embraced by the dissent, will immediately produce a threat
of irreparable injury.
Even though a sitting President is not immune from liability for his nonofficial conduct, it is fair to note
that some of Ms. Jones's defamation claims, as presently alleged, may well fit within the "outer perimeter"
of official responsibility as discussed in Nixon v. Fitzgerald. Thus, at the very least, absolute immunity
defenses to these claims should be immediately taken up and decided by the district court.
The dissent appears to recognize the potential for irreparable harm to Ms. Jones and proposes that her
interests-as balanced against the interests of Mr. Clinton--be analyzed and weighed by shifting the burden
of establishing "irreparable injury" to Ms. Jones, along with the additional burden on Ms. Jones of showing
"that the immediate adjudication of the suit will not significantly impair the President's ability to attend to
the duties of his office." The dissent cites no established authority or case precedent for this burden-shifting
strategy, even by analogy to some reasonably comparable situation. I have discovered none. In this regard,
there is no way, in my view, that a litigant could ever successfully shoulder the burden assigned by the
dissent, especially if all discovery is prohibited. To determine, as a precondition to "immediate adjudication,"
that at some future time the lawsuit will not significantly impair the duties of the President would be an
impossible task. Thus, the dissent's proposed safety valve is valueless, except in its recognition of the
potential for irreparable harm to Ms. Jones caused by the total stay.
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Notwithstanding the separation of powers concerns outlined by the dissent, the burden, in my view,
should be shouldered, as in any other civil litigation, by the party seeking to delay the usual course of
discovery and trial. Otherwise, we will have established requirements of insurmountable proportions for any
litigant who may have a viable and urgent civil claim against a sitting President or perhaps, against other
important governmental figures with constitutionally established duties.
This approach to staying litigation is a well-established legal concept. Traditionally, an applicant for
a stay has the burden of showing specific hardship or inequity if he or she is required to go forward. This may
be a sub silentio recognition of the terms of the Seventh Amendment. However, great public interest may
authorize a stay which is not immoderate or oppressive in its consequences. Thus, while there is a balancing
to be done, the presumption is on Ms. Jones's, not Mr. Clinton's, side. When stays are granted, after the
petitioner for the stay meets his "heavy" burden of showing."the justice and wisdom of a departure from the
beaten track," they must be narrowly tailored or they will amount to an abuse of discretion. Id. Of course,
the justice and wisdom of such a departure will take into account, in this case, that one of the parties is the
sitting President of the United States. Nonetheless, I agree with Judge Bowman that Mr. Clinton should carry
this initial burden, not Ms. Jones.
In determining whether to stay the litigation, Ms. Jones must be given the benefit of the concept that
"[tihe very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection
of the laws, whenever [s]he receives an injury." More recently, and explicitly, access to the courts has been
held to be a "fundamental constitutional right" founded in the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.
Surely, if civil rights actions are of such importance that they may not be impeded or delayed by a
person's incarceration, there must be at least an equal public interest in an ordinary citizen's timely
vindication of his or her most fundamental right against alleged abuse of power by governmental officials.
As noted, Ms. Jones has, in part, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, not a mere run-of-the-mill tort claim.
The violation of civil rights through the abuse of state government positions of power has been of such great
public concern that Congress felt it necessary to enact section 1983 to protect the citizenry and to hold
persons with positions of power accountable for its abuse. Thus, this is not a minor civil dispute to which
one can assign no public interest beside that on the side of the presidency. The balance to be considered,
therefore, is not completely one sided. There is a public interest, as well as an individual interest, on Ms.
Jones's side of the scale. These interests are of such weight that, at least provisionally, Ms. Jones is entitled
to proceed.
II.
I now turn to the potential impact upon the duties of the presidency. The dissent eloquently and properly
raises several unanswered questions, concerning judicial branch interference with the functioning of the
presidency should this suit be allowed to go forward. Again, I readily admit that these are matters of major
concern. In my view, however, these concerns for interbranch interference are greatly overstated by Mr.
Clinton and his amicus. Indeed, they are not appreciably greater than those faced in many other instances
in which a sitting President interfaces as a party, witness, or target with the judicial and legislative branches
of the government. Judge Bowman notes at least three earlier instances in which sitting Presidents have been
involved in civil litigation outside of official presidential duties. Also in the past, under appropriate
circumstances "several American Presidents and former Presidents have given testimony under oath in
judicial or quasi-judicial settings." Former and sitting Presidents have previously submitted, either voluntarily
or involuntarily, to questions under oath. By doing so, they implicitly submitted to the common law rule,
expressed by Lord Hardwicke, "that the public has a right to every man's evidence." Is there any reason why
this right should suffer an exception when the desired knowledge is in the possession of a person occupying
at the moment the office of chief executive of a state? There is no reason at all. His temporary duties as an
official cannot override his permanent and fundamental duty as a citizen and as a debtor to justice.
As a sitting President, Richard Nixon was a defendant in at least two civil actions. In one, Mr. Nixon
was ordered by the Supreme Court to produce tapes subpoenaed by a special prosecutor. In the other the
court held that a President is amenable to legal process, even in his official capacity, if absolutely necessary.
Mr. Nixon did not appeal that determination.
Also, as noted by Rotunda and Nowak, President Jimmy Carter gave videotaped testimony during his
presidency that was presented at the criminal conspiracy trial of two Georgia state officials. Later,
then-sitting President Carter provided videotaped testimony for a grand jury investigating charges that Robert
Vesco had enlisted White House aid to quash extradition proceedings against him. Finally, still-sitting
President Carter was interviewed under oath by Justice Department investigators probing "for criminal, civil,
and administrative purposes" any offenses resulting from Billy Carters relations with the Libyan
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Government. Further, President Gerald Ford was compelled to testify by videotape deposition in the criminal
trial of Lynette (Squeaky) Fromme, who was charged with attempting to assassinate the President. There
are numerous other instances in which a sitting President has both voluntarily or involuntarily appeared at
judicial proceedings and before committees of Congress. Such instances have involved, at least, Presidents
Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant.
I concede that most of these situations have arisen within the framework of governmental operations.
I further concede that there is not a perfect fit between the interests at play in the cited interbranch
proceedings and the civil litigation at issue here. My point is that each named President has obviously
scheduled these encounters without creating a cataclysmic episode in which the constitutional duties of the
office have been compromised.
Ms. Jones's complaint presents relatively uncomplicated civil litigation, the discovery for which can and
should be carried out with a minimum of impact on the President's schedule. It is doubtful, for instance, that
more than one, perhaps two, face-to-face pretrial encounters between the President and Ms. Jones's
representatives need to occur. Indeed, there is not even a requirement that parties be present at the trial of
civil litigation and with some frequency they are not. At the bottom line, the availability of written
interrogatories, written requests for admissions and written stipulations of undisputed facts, as allowed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, would indicate that the actual impact of this litigation on the duties of
the presidency, if that is Mr. Clinton's real concern, is being vastly magnified, especially assuming the trial
judge's careful supervision of the litigation with maximum consideration of the President's constitutional
duties.
Il.
My final concern involves Trooper Danny Ferguson. Even assuming, for sake of argument, the validity
of every constitutional claim or defense advanced by Mr. Clinton, I can find no basis for staying discovery
or trial of the claims against Trooper Ferguson. Whether private citizen or President, it is unlikely that Mr.
Clinton would choose to be present at the deposition of Trooper Ferguson or any sundry witness; certainly
he would not be required to attend and no prejudice is likely to result from his absence. Neither would he
need to be directly concerned with other discovery directed to Trooper Ferguson although it might,
admittedly, affect his interests. Even so, I find no separation of powers or other constitutional basis for a stay
for this portion of the litigation, especially the discovery process.
IV.
I in no way seek to downplay the concerns outlined by the dissent. At the same time, I feel that Judge
Bowman's opinion reasonably charts a fair course through the competing constitutional waters and does so
without serious injury to the rights of any party. As I have attempted to stress, nothing prohibits the trial
judge from halting or delaying or rescheduling any proposed action by any party at any time should she find
that the duties of the presidency are even slightly imperiled. With this understanding, I concur.
ROSS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Instead, I would affirm the judgment of the district court
concluding that the civil action should not be dismissed, but stayed during the President's term in office.
Further, I would reverse the district court's conclusion allowing discovery to proceed.
In my opinion, the language, logic and intent of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, although set in the context of
official acts, applies with equal force to the present factual scenario and directs a conclusion here that, unless
exigent circumstances can be shown, private actions for damages against a sitting President of the United
States, even though based on unofficial acts, must be stayed until the completion of the President's term.
The Fizgerald decision was derived from both the functional necessities of the President's execution of
Article I duties, and the principle that no branch should be subject to crippling incursions by another branch.
The Court's reasoning is highly instructive in the present case because it demonstrates the importance of
insulating the President from the disruptive effects of private suits against him, whether based on official or
unofficial acts. The Fitzgerald Court placed primary reliance on the prospect that the President's discharge
of his constitutional powers and duties would be impaired if he were subject to suits for damages. The Court
stated, "[b]ecause of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concern
with private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government."
This "diversion of energies" argument refers not only to the concern with whether the President will
execute his official duties in a fearless and impartial manner, but also recognizes that the "President occupies
a unique position in the constitutional scheme," one that "distinguishes him from other executive officials."
Article II, § 1 of the Constitution uniquely vests the entire executive power in the President. No other branch
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of government is entrusted to a single person. It is this singularity of the President's constitutional position
that calls for protection from civil litigation.
The unofficial nature of the alleged events would not make defending a private suit for civil damages any
less of a burden on the President's time and attention and therefore on his constitutional responsibilities, or
any less of a "risk[ ] to the effective functioning of government." When the President is called upon to defend
himself during his term of office, even in actions wholly unrelated to his official responsibilities, the dangers
of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch are both real and obvious. The burdens
and demands of civil litigation can be expected to impinge on the President's discharge of his constitutional
office by forcing him to divert his energy and attention from the rigorous demands of his office to the task
of protecting himself against personal liability. That result would disserve the substantial public interest in
the Presidents unhindered execution of his duties and would impair the integrity of the role assigned to the
President by Article II of the Constitution.
Further, the Fitzgerald majority was concerned with the possibility that the "sheer prominence of the
President's office" makes a President "an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages." In his
concurrence, Chief Justice Burger noted the possibility that private suits for damages against a President
could be used for purposes of harassment and extortion. While stated in the context of official acts, Chief
Justice Burger's concurrence applies with equal force to the present case: The need to defend damages suits
would have the serious effect of diverting the attention of a President from his executive duties since
defending a lawsuit today--even a lawsuit ultimately found to be frivolous--often requires significant
expenditures of time and money, as many former public officials have learned to their sorrow.... When
litigation processes are not tightly controlled . .. they can be and are used as mechanisms of extortion.
Ultimate vindication on the merits does not repair the damage.
The same concerns are implicated in the present action as well, where such suits could be pursued merely
for the purpose of gaining partisan political disruption, public notoriety, unwarranted financial gain, or
potential extortion. Indeed, any number of potential private claims could be contrived to entangle a sitting
President in embarrassing or protracted litigation, alleging unwitnessed one-on-one encounters that are
extremely difficult to dispose of by way of a pretrial motion.
The Fitzgerald Court also recognized that presidential immunity is "rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution." The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution assumed that "the President
personally, was not the subject to any process whatever.... For [that] would .. . put it in the power of a
common justice to exercise any authority over him and stop the whole machine of Government." Quoting
Thomas Jefferson, the Supreme Court further underscored its concern that exercising jurisdiction over a
President would create the opportunity for unconstitutional judicial intrusion upon Executive authority:
[W]ould the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, &
to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him
constantly trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional
duties?
In my view, the separation of powers doctrine requires that private civil actions against a sitting President
for unofficial acts must be stayed during the President's term in office. Civil lawsuits against a President
create opportunities for the judiciary to intrude upon the Executive's authority, set the stage for potential
constitutional confrontations between courts and a President, and permit the civil justice system to be used
for partisan political purposes. It cannot be denied that the potential for such conflicts is inherent in
subjecting any President personally to a court's jurisdiction.
The majority concludes the remedy for interference with the performance of the President's official duties
by the demands of discovery and trial preparations and proceedings is the filing of motions with the court
for rescheduling, additional time or continuances. If this route proves to be unsuccessful, the majority
suggests the President should be required to petition this Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, id.,
and arguably then to appeal any adverse decision to the Supreme Court. This suggestion, however, clearly
epitomizes the separation of powers conflict inherent in a system that subjects a sitting President personally
to the court's jurisdiction for the purpose of private civil litigation.
The majority's decision leaves as many questions unanswered as it answers: Must a President seek
judicial approval each time a scheduled deposition or trial date interferes with the performance of his
constitutional duties? Is it appropriate for a court to decide, upon the President's motion, whether the nation's
interest in the unfettered performance of a presidential duty is sufficiently weighty to delay trial proceedings?
Once a conflict arises between the court and the President as to the gravity of an intrusion on presidential
duties, does a court have the authority to ignore the President's request to delay proceedings? Finally, can
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a court dictate a President's activities as they relate to national and international interests of the United States
without creating a separation of powers conflict? While the majority would encourage other courts to
exercise "judicial case management sensitive to the burdens of the presidency," only a stay of civil litigation
during a President's term in office will ensure the performance of Executive duties unencumbered by the
judiciary and thereby avoid separation of powers conflicts.
While noting that the separation of powers doctrine "does not bar every exercise of jurisdiction over the
President of the United States," Fitzgerald, in view of the significant encroachment upon presidential duties
and independence that would necessarily accompany litigation, the Fitzgerald Court admonished that, before
asserting such jurisdiction, a court "must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served [by
the litigation] against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch."
Where there is no urgency to pursue a suit for civil damages; the proper course is to avoid opportunities
for breaching separation of powers altogether by holding the litigation in abeyance until a President leaves
office. The cause of action should be stayed unless the plaintiff can show that he or she will suffer
irreparable injury without immediate relief and that the immediate adjudication of the suit will not
significantly impair the President's ability to attend to the duties of his office.
It is important to keep in mind that the issue here is not whether the President may be required to answer
claims based on unofficial conduct, but when. This conclusion merely delays, rather than defeats, the
vindication of the plaintiffs private legal interests, and thus is far less burdensome for a plaintiff than the
absolute immunity recognized in Fitzgerald. A stay for the duration of the President's service in office would
not prevent Jones from ultimately obtaining an adjudication of her claims. Rather, staying the litigation will
protect the important public and constitutional interests in the Presidents unimpaired performance of his
duties, while preserving a plaintiffs ability to obtain resolution of his or her claims on the merits. Postponing
adjudication of private damage actions will rarely defeat a plaintiffs ability to ultimately obtain meaningful
relief "[W]e do well to bear in mind that the focus must not be simply on the matter of judging individual
conduct in a fact-bound setting; rather, in those familiar terms of John Marshall, it is a Constitution we are
expounding. Constitutional adjudication often bears unpalatable fruit But the needs of a system of
government sometimes must outweigh the right of individuals to collect damages."
The well-known travail of litigation and its effect on the ability of the President to perform his duties,
as well as the subjection of the President to the ongoing jurisdiction of the courts and the attendant impact
on the separation of powers, dictate the postponement of non-exigent, private civil damages litigation until
the President leaves office.
In my opinion, the stay should include pretrial discovery, as well as the trial proceedings, because
discovery is likely to pose even more intrusive and burdensome demands on the President's time and attention
than the eventual trial itself Similarly, I would grant a stay of proceedings against a co-defendant of a sitting
President where, given all the circumstances, the claims against the co-defendant cannot proceed without
materially diminishing the effectiveness of a stay of proceedings against the President. I agree with the
district court's conclusion here that a stay of the claims against Trooper Ferguson is essential if the President
is to be fully protected.
Out of respect for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President, I
conclude the President ordinarily should not be required to defend himself against civil actions until after the
completion of his service in office. Therefore I would hold that to rebut the presumption that private suits
against a sitting President should not go forward during the President's service in office, the plaintiff should
have to demonstrate convincingly both that delay will seriously prejudice the plaintiffs interests and that
immediate adjudication of the suit will not significantly impair the President's ability to attend to the duties
of his office. Absent such a showing, the litigation should be deferred.
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OPINION: The suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied.
The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.
. . McMILLLAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial of the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
The majority opinion not only has put short pants on President William Jefferson Clinton, but also has
succeeded in demeaning the Office of the President of the United States, recognized throughout the world
as the most powerful office in the world, an office which, at this time, is grappling with world problems in
Bosnia, Iran, China, Taiwan, Cuba, Russia, and most third-world nations, not to mention the myriad of
domestic problems here at home. Never has there been a question of whether President Clinton is above the
law and immune from suit, the question is only "when?" My colleagues, to my dismay, would put all the
problems of our nation on pilot control and treat as more urgent a private lawsuit that even the appellant
delayed filing for at least three years.
The panel opinion in this case unfortunately misinterprets the principles enunciated in Nixon v.
Fitzgerald. The panel opinion will allow judicial interference with, and control of, the President's time, at
least in part. The ruling thus violates the separation of powers doctrine and should be reviewed by this court
en banc. I dissent from the court's refusal to do so.
My reading of Fitzgerald discloses two separate rationales for the immunity granted to former President
Richard Nixon. The first rationale focuses on the "public interest in providing an official 'the maximum
ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with' the duties of his office." This rationale reflects the concern that
the threat of a lawsuit could interfere with the President's ability to carry out his or her official duties.
"Among the most persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the prospect that damages liability may
render an official unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties." This is the official action rationale
which confers immunity to a president from lawsuits even after completion of his or her term of office.
The second rationale applies to lawsuits, such as the present one, filed during the President's term but
arising from conduct or events which are unrelated to the President's official duties. This rationale is not
based upon the need for fearless and impartial decision making by the President but rather is based upon the
need to allow the President to carry out his or her official duties free from unnecessary interference and
distraction. As the Court stated in Fitzgerald, "in view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his
actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages."
The historical discussion of presidential immunity in note 31 of the Fitzgerald opinion emphasizes that such
immunity rests in large measure on avoiding distractions from the official duties of the President. In part that
note provides:
Justice Story, writing in 1833, held it implicit in the separation of powers that the President must be
permitted to discharge his duties undistracted by private lawsuits. Thomas Jefferson also argued that the
President was not intended to be subject tojudicial process. When Chief Justice Marshall held in United
States v. Burr that a subpoena duces tecum can be issued to a President, Jefferson protested strongly,
and stated his broader view of the proper relationship between the Judiciary and the President: "The
leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the Legislature, executive and judiciary of
each other, and none are more jealous of this than the judiciary. But would the executive be independent
of the judiciary, if he were subject to the commands of the latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience;
if the several courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to
south & east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties? The intention of the
Constitution, that each branch should be independent of the others, is further manifested by the means
it has furnished to each, to protect itself from enterprises of force attempted on them by the others, and
to none has it given more effectual or diversified means than to the executive."
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Judge Beam's concurring opinion in the present case illuminates the problem ofjudicial interference with
the President's official duties. The consequence of the panel's decision is that now there will be a trial judge
exercising some control over the President's schedule. As Judge Beam concludes:
I in no way seek to downplay the concerns outlined by the dissent. At the same time, I feel that Judge
Bowman's opinion reasonably charts a fair course through the competing constitutional waters and does
so without serious injury to the rights of any party. As I have attempted to stress, nothing prohibits the
trial judge from halting or delaying or rescheduling any proposed action by any party at any time should
she find that the duties of the presidency are even slightly imperiled. With this understanding, I concur.
Conversely, however, nothing prohibits the trial judge from ordering the President to appear, testify,
provide discovery, answer numerous interrogatories and requests for admissions at the trial judge's almost
unrestricted discretion. Indeed, figuratively, the courts may 'bandy him from pillar to post." If that does not
violate the separation of powers between the President and the judiciary, what does?
The Constitution of the United States provides in Article II, Section 1, "The executive power shall be
vested in the President of the United States of America." Even assuming a trial judge of reasonably good
judgment, judicial control over the sitting President of the United States as a defendant in an ongoing civil
lawsuit must constitute a far greater affront to our separation of powers principles than that which was at
stake in the Fitzgerald case, where the defendant was not a sitting president.
In my opinion, Judge Ross got it exactly right when he wrote in his dissent:
The Fitzgerald decision was derived from both the functional necessities of the President's execution of
Article II duties, and the principle that no branch should be subject to crippling incursions by another
branch. The Court's reasoning is highly instructive in the present case because it demonstrates the
importance of insulating the President from the disruptive effects of private suits against him, whether
based on official or unofficial acts.
Finally, the impact of the limited presidential immunity sought here by President Clinton is far less
drastic than the immunity granted to former President Nixon in Fitzgerald. Although President Nixon was
no longer in office at the time of that lawsuit, his immunity was absolute. It left the plaintiff without any
remedy. That is not the case here. The appellant in the present action can pursue her claims after President
Clinton leaves office. While delay may be unfortunate for the appellant, it is not necessarily prejudicial. She
still retains her right to sue. What must be of greatest concern in this controversy is the welfare of this nation
- and indeed of the entire world - over which the President of the United States exerts such strong influence
as "the officeholder [who] make[s] the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official
under our constitutional system."
Although this court has refused to consider this important case en banc, I have every confidence that the
issues of national concem in this case relating to the judiciary's relationship to the presidency will command
the attention of the United States Supreme Court.
46
Note
BIRTH OF A THIRD IMMUNITY? PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON SECURES
TEMPORARY IMMUNITY FROM TRIAL
Boston College Law Review, July, 1995; 36 B.C. L. REv. 725
Laurier W. Beaupre
In recent history, United States government officials have enjoyed one of two types of immunity from
civil damages suits: absolute immunity or qualified immunity. Absolute immunity--granted only to the
President, judges, prosecutors, executive officials exercising judicial functions and legislators--shields
officials from liability predicated by actions taken within the scope of their authority. Absolute immunity
prevails even when officials act with deliberate malice or with knowledge that they are breaking the law. In
contrast, qualified immunity-accorded to executive branch officials (including Cabinet Secretaries),
presidential aides, plus state and local officials--shields administrators only when they have reasonable
grounds to believe their actions were not against the law. Moreover, the action taken must be discretionary,
as opposed to ministerial, in character.
On December 28, 1994, in Jones v. Clinton, Judge Susan Webber Wright of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas raised the specter of a third immunity: temporary immunity from
trial. Available only to the President, this new immunity would shield him from trial, though not from
discovery, while in office.
The facts of Jones v. Clinton probably are familiar to even casual followers of current events due to
high-profile media coverage. Former Arkansas state employee Paula Corbin Jones initially burst into the
headlines on February 11, 1994. At a Washington, D.C., press conference, Jones accused President Bill
Clinton of making improper and unwanted sexual advances to her while he was Governor of Arkansas.
According to Jones, the encounter occurred at the Governor's Quality Control Conference at a Little Rock
hotel on May 8, 1991. Arkansas State Trooper Danny Ferguson, then assigned to Governor Clinton's security
detail, allegedly approached Jones while she was working at the conference registration desk. Ferguson told
Jones that Clinton wished to meet her in a private hotel suite. Ferguson escorted Jones to the designated
suite, where Clinton allegedly touched her suggestively and requested sexual favors. According to Jones, she
promptly refused the governor's advances and left the room within minutes. In contrast, President Clinton
denies not only making improper advances, but that he has ever met Jones at all.
On May 6, 1994, just days before a three-year statute of limitations was to expire, Jones filed suit in the
United States District Court in Little Rock, Arkansas, against both President Clinton and Trooper Ferguson.
The complaint alleged that Clinton, acting under color of law as Governor of Arkansas, deprived Jones of
her equal protection and due process rights by acts of sexual harassment, professional retaliation and
defamation. Jones further alleged state law claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Speaking at a news conference the day of the filing, Clinton attorney Robert S. Bennett first
suggested that the President might assert an immunity defense, arguing that a sitting President could not be
sued for civil damages during his term. Previewing an argument based on public policy grounds, Bennett
urged reporters to consider the consequences resulting if the President could face suit: "There could be
thousands of lawsuits. Your President would be tied down for 365 days a year being asked questions by
lawyers." In a July 21, 1994, ruling, Judge Wright agreed to consider Clinton's immunity defense as a
threshold question, delaying trial on the merits of the case. In compliance with Wright's ruling, Clinton moved
on August 10, 1994, to dismiss Jones's complaint without prejudice on grounds of absolute immunity and
to freeze the statute of limitations until he was no longer in office, at which time Jones could refile.
The court subsequently refused to dismiss the suit, denying Clinton's claim of absolute immunity. The
court did agree to stay the trial until the end of Clinton's term, but allowed discovery to proceed. The court's
creation of what it termed "temporary immunity from trial" marks the first judicial determination of whether
a sitting President can claim immunity from civil damages suits based on actions that occurred before he took
office. Both sides have already appealed the court's decision, and the controversy may well reach the United
States Supreme Court.
Jones v. Clinton charts entirely new waters in the presidential immunity area. In all previous immunity
cases, the litigants claimed damages based on official acts taken during the President's or other official's term.
Jones, on the other hand, bases her claim on an encounter that occurred before the President assumed office
and bears no relation to any official duty.
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This Note argues that although the court reached the correct decision in denying President Clinton's
absolute immunity claim, it subsequently erred in staying the trial. Rather, the courts should adopt a
presumptive amenability doctrine, permitting a lawsuit based on unofficial conduct to go forward unless the
President can show specifically why it would render him unable to govern. Section I traces the development
of sovereign immunity doctrine in the United States up to the Jones v. Clinton controversy. Section II then
summarizes the arguments presented both for and against President Clinton's immunity motion. Section m
discusses in detail the decision reached by the district court. Finally, Section IV analyzes that decision and
presents arguments why it should be, in part, reversed.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. English Common Law Roots and the Framers' Intent
All Anglo-American sovereign immunity doctrine can trace its roots to thiEnglish maxim that "The King
can do no wrong." This maxim did not mean specifically that the King could not be sued, although it has so
been interpreted. It swept far more broadly, meaning that the Sovereign was in fact incapable of committing
an illegal or malicious act. But precise definitions notwithstanding, by the early thirteenth century settled law
proclaimed that the King could not be subject to judicial process. In fact, the Queen enjoys absolute immunity
from tort claims to this day, her protection ensured by the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947.
Instead, English citizens could request redress of grievances against the King by a "petition of right," a
privilege open to Crown subjects since the late thirteenth century. The Chancellor or Privy Council screened
petitions to determine whether the supplicant had a legitimate cause of action under the common law. If so,
they referred the petition to the King's Bench, Chancellory or the Exchequer for final disposition according
to the law. Although the King could refuse a petition at his pleasure, scholars contend that he rarely did so
without substantial legal reasons. They characterize the petition of right as a delicate social contract: in
return for his position as the sovereign source of all law, the King must in turn subject himself to the law he
promulgated. Thus, although technically immune from damages claims, the King acquiesced to them in
practice.
At early common law, the philosophy that "the King could do no wrong" extended to his judges as well.
To fault ajudge for his execution of the King's law, early jurists reasoned, was the same as faulting the King.
Thus, suits against a judge based on his official actions were prohibited as tantamount to suits against the
King himself.
As the common law developed, seventeenth-century English courts crafted a public policy rationale to
further justify judicial immunity. Jurists such as Coke argued that subjecting a judge to civil damages for
his decisions would weaken the court's authority and subject the bench to constant harassment from losing
litigants. Thus, English courts dispensed justice swaddled in a warm cloak of immunity spun not only from
the Divine Right of Kings, but from solid pragmatism as well.
In the case of administrative officials, the King similarly could insulate them from suit by claiming their
acts as the Crown's own. If the King could do no unjust act, jurists reasoned, neither could officers carrying
out his wishes. But like the petition of right, this maxim held more rhetorical weight than practical
significance. Merely local officials lost immunity protection because the courts reasoned they were just
functionaries of the Privy Council, not agents of the King himself. Moreover, litigants could bypass the
immunity cloak shielding higher officials simply by suing them in their own names, rather than in the name
of the Crown. By doing so, plaintiffs no longer called into question the inviolability of the King. Lords of
the Admiralty, Cabinet Secretaries and Colonial Governors all answered to the courts for their actions as a
result.
In contrast, legislative immunity in England sprang from Parliamentary invention, not from judicial
reasoning. In the seventeenth-century struggles between Parliament and the Stuart monarchs, the Crown
frequently used imprisonment for treason or seditious libel to silence critics in Parliament. Once the Glorious
Revolution had swept the Stuarts from power, Parliamentarians concluded that they must protect themselves
from such coercion in the future. To accomplish this, Parliament passed the Bill of Rights in 1689, which
proclaimed "[t]hat the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be
impeached or questioned in any Court"
In laying the foundations of American immunity doctrine, the Founding Fathers paralleled the English
structure in place at the time. They enacted legislative immunities into positive law, while leaving
presidential, judicial and other official immunities up to the courts. But even though presidential immunity
is mentioned neither in the Constitution nor in any statute, it did prove a topic for debate among early
statesmen.
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John Adams and Oliver Ellsworth argued that "the President, personally, was not the subject to any
process whatsoever," reasoning that to do otherwise would allow the courts to "stop the whole machine of
Government." Writing somewhat later, in 1833, Justice Story similarly argued that the separation of powers
doctrine dictated that the President "must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official
inviolability." Moreover, Thomas Jefferson, piqued at the Virginia District Court's enforcement of a
subpoena duces tecum against him, complained that amenability to process undermined the President's
ability to function.
In contrast, Chief Justice Marshall, in his 1803 Marbury v. Madison opinion, counselled in expansive
terms against denying citizens their legal right of redress: "The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high
appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Moreover, Charles
Pinckney argued that the framers deliberately chose not to grant the President immunity because they "well
knew how oppressively the power of undefined privileges had been exercised in Great Britain, and were
determined no such authority should ever be exercised here." In sum, a search for consensus among the
founding fathers regarding presidential immunity leads to the conclusion that none existed. Justice Powell
in Nixon v. Fitzgerald stated his belief that the opinions of Adams, Jefferson and Ellsworth represented the
great weight of evidence on the issue. Nonetheless, those statesmen comprising the great weight of evidence
never memorialized their opinions regarding presidential immunity into positive law.
B. Judicial Grants of Absolute Immunity
The absence of Constitutional authority left the creation of an American immunity doctrine where it had
been in England: in the courts. Until the 1970's, the United States Supreme Court followed a strict "all or
nothing" approach: the Court granted public officials either absolute immunity from civil damages suits
based on official actions or no immunity at all. At its most expansive, absolute immunity shielded the
discretionary official acts of judges, quasi-judicial officers and executive branch officials ranging from the
President and Cabinet Secretaries to mid-level bureaucrats.
In 1871, in Bradley v. Fsher, the United States Supreme Court held judges absolutely immune from civil
damages liability for judicial acts, provided they did not knowingly exceed their jurisdiction. In Bradley, an
attorney sued a District of Columbia judge for striking his name from the roll of lawyers admitted to plead
before the court, alleging a malicious campaign to put him out of business. In reaching its decision, the Court
adopted the English doctrine of judicial immunity based on public policy, but made no reference to the
common law maxim of absolute immunity descending from the sovereign. Citing Coke, the Court reasoned
that judges must be free to follow their consciences without fear of litigation or else the legal system could
not function. The Court further noted that judges were particularly vulnerable to a deluge of suits due to the
great financial and emotional consequences of their decisions. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the suit on
absolute immunity grounds, noting that disciplining an attorney, even if done maliciously, still constituted
a judicial act.
High-ranking executive branch officials donned the judge's absolute immunity cloak in 1896. In
Spalding v. Vilas, the United States Supreme Court held that the Postmaster General could not face civil
damages liability for actions taken within the scope of his official authority, even if he acted maliciously.
An attorney who had lobbied the government on behalf of local postmasters brought suit after the Postmaster
General sent his clients a letter branding his representation unnecessary. As in Bradley, the Court grounded
its decision on public policy imperatives. Just as the judicial system could not function if judges feared
lawsuits, the Court reasoned, the executive branch could not function if officials could not act in the public
interest without fearing liability. Again, the Court dismissed the suit on absolute immunity grounds, finding
the Postmaster General's actions to be within the scope of his official authority.
The doctrine of absolute immunity from civil damages reached its broadest extension in 1959, when the
United States Supreme Court in Barr v. Matteo held that absolute immunity extended to executive branch
officials far below cabinet rank, provided they acted within the scope of their authority. In Barr, suspended
employees of the Office of Rent Stabilization sued the agency's acting director for allegedly libeling them
in a press release. The Court noted that executive officials of lower rank, such as an acting director, often
performed discretionary functions as complex as those of their superiors. The Court thus concluded that
lesser officials required the same ability to act without fear of financial liability. Accordingly, the Court
dismissed the suit, finding that issuing a press release fell within the outer perimeter of the acting director's
authority.
Although none of these cases specifically cloaked the President with absolute immunity from civil
damages, lower courts nonetheless considered it to be a matter of settled law. In the early 1970's, for
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example, a wave of suits filed against President Nixon all were dismissed on absolute immunity grounds. As
precedent, many courts employed the 1866 United States Supreme Court holding in Mississippi v. Johnson.
In Mississippi v. Johnson, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin President Andrew
Johnson from enforcing the Reconstmction Acts. The State of Mississippi had sought to block enforcement,
claiming the Acts were unconstitutional. The Court reasoned, however, that enjoining the President from
performing his constitutional duty to enforce the laws would violate the separation of powers doctrine. Such
judicial interference, the Court feared, would hurtle the executive branch towards a head-on collision with
either the judiciary, if President Johnson refused to obey the injunction, or with Congress if he did.
Accordingly, the Court refused to hear the merits of Mississippi's case.
One hundred and six years later, in Reese v. Nixon, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California held that the separation of powers doctrine likewise precluded it from hearing a civil
damages claim against the President. The plaintiffs sought damages for alleged civil rights violations
committed by President Nixon and more than 500 other federal, state and local officials, including "various
unnamed 'agents- provocateurs."' The court reasoned, however, that the broad separation of powers
philosophy expounded in Mississippi v. Johnson precluded not only injunctive relief, but civil damages relief
as well. Thus, the court dismissed President Nixon as a defendant.
C. Development of a Qualified Immunity Doctrine
It took no less potent a lever than the United States Constitution to pry loose federal officials' grip on
absolute immunity from civil damages. By asserting violations of constitutional rights as the basis for their
suits, litigants stripped the absolute immunity defense from executive officials as high as cabinet rank and,
briefly, from the President himself. In its place, a doctrine of qualified immunity developed, under which
officials remained immune from damages for official actions within the scope of their responsibility.
Immunity only attached, however, if the officials did not violate a clearly established constitutional or
statutory right of which a reasonable person would have known.
The United States Supreme Court set the stage for the unraveling of executive officials' absolute
immunity protection in 1971 by allowing violations of Fourth Amendment rights to serve as a basis to sue
federal officers. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau ofNarcotics, the Court
held that plaintiffs could recover money damages from federal officials who violated their constitutional
rights. Plaintiff Bivens claimed that federal agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him
without probable cause or a warrant. The Justices noted that when fundamental rights were violated, courts
historically could award any remedy to make good the wrong, including money damages. Accordingly, the
Court held that Bivens had a cause of action for damages against the agents who violated his constitutional
rights. The Court did not rule on whether the agents possessed immunity protection, however, remanding that
question to the lower courts instead.
In deciding the immunity question, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit did nothing
to modify prevailing absolute immunity doctrine: it simply declined to extend absolute immunity to the agents
based on the facts of the case. The cowt found it settled law that "certain officers of the federal government"
were absolutely immune from lawsuits while acting in their official capacities, even when charged with
malice. The court further noted, however, that this immunity extended only to discretionary functions.
Concluding that making an arrest was only a ministerial and not a discretionary act, the court held that the
officers merited no absolute immunity protection.
The Supreme Court's doctrine of qualified immunity for federal officials actually developed in the context
of Constitution-based suits against state and local officials. In 1974, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, the United States
Supreme Court refused to dismiss a damages claim against Ohio Governor James Rhodes, holding that he
possessed no absolute immunity from suits alleging violations of federal constitutional rights.
Representatives of students killed in the 1971 Kent State University shootings invoked 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985 to charge that Rhodes had violated the students' constitutional right to due process by recklessly
and unnecessarily deploying the National Guard. Seizing upon the basis of the plaintiffs claim, the Court
explained that constitutional rights served as the paramount limit on any official's authority. The Court
further reasoned that providing state officials absolute immunity from suits based on §§ 1983 and 1985
would gut the laws' intent to afford injured citizens a private cause of action for violations of their
constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court concluded that state officials received only qualified immunity
from civil damages suits alleging constitutional violations. Officials could claim immunity only if they
reasonably believed that their actions were within the scope of their authority and not against the law.
The Supreme Court applied its reasoning in Scheuer to federal officials in 1978. In Butz v. Economou,
the Court held that executive branch officials, including those of Cabinet rank, received no greater immunity
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from civil damages than state officials when sued on constitutional grounds. Economou, a commodities
trader, sued Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz for allegedly trying to revoke his trading registration in
retaliation for criticism of Butz's department. In reaching its conclusion, the Court distinguished the earlier
holdings in Spalding and Barr, noting that neither case involved violations of constitutional rights. Once
officials violate the Constitution, the Court reiterated, they exceed the scope of their authority and no longer
qualify for absolute immunity protection. Thus, the Court held that federal officials receive only qualified
immunity from damages based on constitutional grounds. The Butz Court left intact, however, absolute
immunity protection for federal officials performing special functions, specifically judges, prosecutors and
other officials performing adjudicative functions. The Court also left open the question of whether other
federal officials could show that public policy demanded absolute immunity protection for them as well.
In 1979, in Halperin v. Kissinger, the United-States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit carried the Supreme Court's evolving qualified immunity doctrine to the doorstep of the President
himself. The court held that President Nixon possessed no immunity protection if he lacked reasonable
grounds to believe his actions were within the law. Plaintiff Halperin, a National Security Council staff
member, alleged that Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger violated his constitutional rights
by wiretapping his telephone. The court reasoned that granting the President absolute immunity from
constitutional claims, when other executive branch officials received only qualified immunity, would be
tantamount to placing Nixon above the law. To escape Butz, the court added, the President must show either
an implicit constitutional exemption or sufficiently drastic public policy consequences. Concluding that
Nixon had shown neither, the court denied his use of an absolute immunity defense. An equally divided
United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision per curiam, and qualified immunity for the President
stood as the law of the land.
D. The President Recaptures Absolute Immunity: Nixon v. Fitzgerald
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court by a bare 5-4 majority held that the President enjoyed absolute
immunity from civil damages for official actions taken within the outer perimeter of his authority. The
plaintiff inNixon v. Fitzgerald, an Air Force cost control expert, alleged that Nixon and White House aides
violated his First Amendment rights by forcing him from his job in retaliation for damaging testimony he
gave before Congress. The Court reasoned that the President's unique position as chief constitutional officer
demanded the absolute immunity from civil damages denied to other executive branch officials by Butz.
Article II grants the President unique responsibilities, such as conducting foreign affairs, serving as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and managing the entire executive branch, which the Court held
required the utmost discretion and sensitivity. As these responsibilities entail decisions likely to arouse
intense passions, the Court worried that each presidential decision, like a judge's verdict, could prove a
lightning rod for civil suits. In sum, the Court worried that subjecting the President to civil damages liability
based on his actions would hamstring his ability to make the difficult decisions the Republic required him
to make. This prospect outweighed the losses to just one person that civil damages could compensate. The
Court accordingly upheld President Nixon's absolute immunity defense on public policy grounds and
dismissed Fitzgerald's claim.
Writing in concurrence, Chief Justice Burger noted that Fitzgerald's holding was a narrow one, granting
absolute immunity only for civil damages claims and only for official acts within the President's authority.
Moreover, the Fitzgerald Court's grant of absolute immunity did not come without vigorous dissent. Justice
White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, stated that the majority's holding placed the
President above the law and directly contradicted Butz. Justice White also pointed out that the Butz Court
sanctioned absolute immunity only when officials performed particularly sensitive functions, such as
adjudicating a dispute. Therefore, Justice White reasoned, the President likewise deserved an absolute cloak
only when engaged in particularly sensitive functions, which did not include terminating an unwanted
employee.
E. Presidential Amenability to Criminal Process as Opposed to Civil Suit
Although President Nixon narrowly succ=ed in capturing absolute immunity from civil damages suits,
Presidents have enjoyed less luck holding the courts at bay in the context of criminal trials. In 1807, in
United States v. Burr, Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a trial court judge in the treason trial of Aaron Burr,
enforced a subpoena duces tecum issued to President Jefferson by the defense. Marshall held that "the
President of the United States may be subpoenaed, and examined as a witness, and required to produce any
paper in his possession." He did note that a President could in.some cases assert reasons compelling enough
to restrain a court from demanding documents. But upon finding that Jefferson offered no such reasons in
this case, Marshall enforced the subpoena.
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In 1972, in United States v. Nixon, the United States Supreme Court similarly refused to quash a
subpoena duces tecum compelling President Nixon to tun over the Watergate tapes, a decision that preceded
his resignation by just a few days. Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski wanted to use the taped conversations
between Nixon and top aides as evidence in the aides' trial for conspiracy and obstruction of justice. The
President moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that a general executive privilege immunized him from
obeying the court's order. Citing Marshall's reasoning in Burr, the Nixon Court recognized a presumptive
executive privilege flowing from the separation of powers. The Court subsequently held, however, that
neither the separation of powers nor confidentiality concerns rendered that right absolute. Courts must
maintain the most rigorous legal standards in a criminal trial, the Court reasoned, lest they risk punishing the
innocent or acquitting the guilty. Thus, a merely general claim of privilege must yield to the greater need to
develop all relevant facts in a criminal trial. As the President had not offered any specific reasons why the
tapes must remain secret, the Court enforced the subpoena. In sum, after United States v. Nixon, the
President can still theoretically invoke immunity from criminal process. He must, however, state specifically
why his duties demand it.
II. THE ARGUMENTS IN JONES V CLINTON
At the outset, President Clinton acknowledged that case law, although granting him absolute immunity
from damages based on official acts, offered no settled protection from damages based on events that
occurred before he took office. Clinton further acknowledged that a key rationale behind the Fitzgerald
holding-fear that potential liability would render Presidents timid in making official decisions--also would
not apply in the Jones case. For these reasons, the President declined to request the absolute permanent
immunity awarded in Fitzgerald. Instead, Clinton sought a new solution: absolute temporary immunity,
lasting only until he left office. This immunity would consist of dismissal without prejudice with leave to
refile after he returned to private life.
Clinton's arguments, as well as those in rebuttal, focused on two broad themes: (1) the necessity of
shielding the President from the distractions defending a suit would cause, and (2) the separation of powers'
mandate restricting judicial interference with the executive branch. In addition, Clinton contended that Jones
possessed no compelling need for immediate relief that would outweigh his interests. Finally, Clinton
buttressed the reasonableness of his request by pointing out that temporary immunity did not deny Jones
eventual satisfaction. Rather, it merely compelled her to wait the same way other plaintiffs must wait to seek
damages against active duty military personnel.
A. Civil Suits and Impermissible Distraction of the President
Despite conceding that its holding was not on point, Clinton nonetheless relied on the Fitzgerald Court's
concem that defending against civil suits would unacceptably divert a President's attention from vital duties.
Article II of the United States Constitution, Clinton pointed out, vests the entire executive power in just one
person, who is ultimately responsible for enforcing the laws, commanding the armed forces and managing
the entire executive branch. As the one ultimately responsible, the President is thus indispensable to the
execution of this power. This unique responsibility, Clinton contended, led the Fitzgerald Court to conclude
"[bjecause of the singular importance of the President's duties, diversion of his energies by concerns with
private lawsuits would raise unique risks to the effective functioning of government." When or why the cause
of action arose is inrelevant, the President argued, the disruptive effect would remain the same. The President
would spend weeks in depositions and conferences with his lawyers, rather than attending to the duties of his
office. As the defendant, Clinton argued, he could not delegate trial preparation to subordinates because his
personal conduct was the entire basis of the suit.
Clinton further argued that one successful suit would undoubtedly spawn others, many frivolous, which
would multiply the demands on his time. Moreover, denying immunity only would encourage political
enemies to postpone filing until after he took office, thereby inflicting the maximum political damage. By
encouraging such "strike suits," Clinton contended, the courts not only would prevent him from doing his job,
but also would become pawns in the game of politics. Thus, the President concluded, the same balancing
rationale the Court applied in Fitzgerald must apply here: one individual's damages claim must temporarily
give way to the greater public interest vested in a Chief Executive wholly focused on his duties.
The Solicitor General, opining as amicus curiae, concurred with Clinton's argument that generalized
concerns about the value of the President's time helped guide the Fitzgerald Court's holding. When mere
private citizens are sued, the Solicitor General added, the demands on their time are merely a private concern.
But when the President is sued, such a distraction concerns the entire nation, and therefore outweighs one
plaintiffs desire for immediate relief.
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In contrast, Jones and a consortium of law professors opining as amicus curiae contested the President's
interpretation of Fitzgerald. They argued that the Fitzgerald Court's concerns focused solely on enabling
the President to make difficult official decisions without fearing liability. In other words, Jones and her allies
contended that the Court never deemed the President simply too busy to defend against lawsuits. Thus,
shielding the President from suits based on just any action, they concluded, would place the President above
the law.
Had the Court generally been concerned with demands on the President's time, they implied, it would not
have crafted Fitzgeralds holding as narrowly as it did. Fitzgerald, they contended, limits the President's
absolute immunity protection to damages suits based on official acts "within the outer perimeter of his
authority." Moreover, they argued, this limitation exists in all the immunity case law preceding the
Ftzgerald decision.- No other official granted absolute immunity can extend his cloak to unofficial conduct.
Based on Chief Justice Burger's Fitzgerald concurrence, they concluded, neither can the Chief Executive.
The professors further argued that ridding himself of meritless suits would not unduly burden the
President's time. The courts have ample tools, such as rule 12(b)(6) motions, summary judgement and rule
11 sanctions, both to dispense with frivolous suits quickly and to discourage litigants from bringing them
in the first place. Even if a meritorious suit were to proceed, they contended, the courts still could
accommodate the Presidents special needs with in-camera inspection of documents or videotaped testimony.
Also opining as amicus curiae, the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") bolstered Jones's case by
arguing that absolute immunity would prove ineffective at shielding the President from distraction. Even if
the President escaped trial in a court of law, he still would face trial in "the court of public opinion," for which
he would need to mount a publicity defense every bit as time-consuming as a legal one. Moreover, a plaintiff
still could file a complaint, the ACLU contended, then claim the President was hiding from the merits behind
an immunity defense.
B. Civil Damages Suits and the Separation of Powers Doctrine
The separation of powers doctrine provided the second principal thrust of the President's argument.
Under this doctrine, one branch of the federal government may not encroach on the domain or exercise the
powers of another. With respect to this doctrine, Clinton and the Solicitor General noted, courts traditionally
avoid intruding upon presidential decision-making and must balance the interests at stake before they do.
In Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that the dangers of encroaching on executive branch prerogative
outweighed one litigant's need for redress. Therefore, Clinton and the Solicitor General concluded, executive
branch prerogative outweighs Jones's claim as well.
The President bolstered his arguments with specific examples of the judicial deference Presidents have
enjoyed, even when called to produce evidence in criminal trials. In United States v. Nixon, Clinton noted,
the Supreme Court declared presidential communications presumptively privileged, finding such a privilege
necessary to the effective discharge of the President's duties. Although the Court compelled President Nixon
to divulge the Watergate tapes, he added, it still granted in-camera inspection to ensure they contained no
privileged material.
Moreover, Clinton contended that the founding fathers intended the separation of powers doctrine to
preclude civil suits against the President. According to the diary of Pennsylvania Senator William Maclay,
such luminaries as Adams, Jefferson and Ellsworth believed that "the President personally was not subject
to any process whatever, for to permit otherwise would 'put it in the power of a common Justice to exercise
any [a]uthority over him and Stop the Whole Machine of Government."' Clinton further noted that some
founders even opposed the Impeachment Clause, albeit unsuccessfully, as a dangerous intrusion on
presidential independence. Gouverneur Morris, for example, protested that "impeachment will render the
Executive dependent on those who are to impeach."
Gouverneur Morris's objections notwithstanding, Clinton cited the Impeachment Clause as further
illustrating the Constitution's attempt to disentangle the judiciary from presidential affairs. Most of the
framers and modem scholars believe, Clinton contended, that the President must be removed from office
before he is indicted. Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist that "[t]he President would be liable to
be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed
from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law."
Just twenty-two years ago, Solicitor General Robert Bork echoed Hamilton's view, Clinton added. Opining
on whether the Vice President could be indicted before impeachment, Bork concluded that only the President
himself must be impeached first. Therefore, Clinton reasoned, if criminal prosecutions must wait until the
President leaves office, civil damages actions must wait as well.
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For her part, Jones interpreted the scope of the separation of powers doctrine very differently. She
contended that the doctrine exists solely to protect presidential decision-making from judicial interference
and does not apply in cases of purely private presidential conduct. Fitzgerald and other immunity cases
illustrate her point, she contended, because they permit immunity from damages suits to extend only to
official duties. As Clinton's alleged conduct had nothing to do with his official duties, Jones concluded,
separation of powers concerns prove no obstacle to her suit.
Expounding on Jones's argument, the law professors and ACLU argued that the President can claim
shelter from the separation of powers only when he can show specifically how judicial process would
hamstring his ability to govern. Merely generalized concerns are not enough, they contended. The professors
pointed to United States v. Nixon as support, claiming that Nixon failed to prevail because he could not
identify any specific threat to his ability to govern, such as the revelation of military or diplomatic secrets.
They quoted a subsequent Supreme Court analysis of United States v. Nixon to underscore their argument:
[I]n determining whether a [challenged act] disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate
branches, the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present
must we then determine whether that impact is justified. Noting that Clinton had identified only general
threats to his effectiveness, the professors concluded that the separation of powers doctrine should not
bar Jones from pressing her case.
All parties opposing Clinton also noted that the separation of powers doctrine may have proved a hurdle,
but never a total bar to judicial proceedings aimed at the President. This doctrine has been settled law, they
claimed, since Chief Justice Marshall inMarbury v. Madison declared that it was the judiciary's role "to say
what the law is." Marshall reinforced his Marbury precedent in United States v. Burr, Jones contended,
when he ruled that a subpoena decus tecum could be directed at the President. In United States v. Nixon, the
Court similarly compelled the President to comply with a subpoena, she added, despite its recognition of a
presumptive executive privilege to keep official communications confidential. Thus, Jones argued, the
separation of powers doctrine provided no automatic bar to her claim.
In sum, Jones and her allies concluded that Burr and United States v. Nixon teach a different lesson than
that learned by the President In their interpretation, separation of powers concerns, although relevant, cannot
alone justify absolute immunity from judicial oversight. If the courts can compel a President to respond to
criminal process, they concluded, they likewise can to compel him to answer for his unofficial conduct.
Jones also drew a different lesson from the founding fathers, claiming that their greatest achievement
lay in creating a republic in which everyone, even the President, exists under the law. Citing Charles
Pinckney, Jones claimed that the framers sharply defined the President's Article II powers to avoid the
executive tyranny experienced under British rule. To shield the President from civil damages based on his
private conduct, she concluded, would defeat the founders' overriding purpose by placing him beyond legal
accountability.
Finally, Jones attacked the President's Impeachment Clause analogy, claiming it irrelevant to a civil
damages claim. The main rationale underlying impeachment before indictment, she contended, is to avoid
the untenable prospect of a President imprisoned while in office. As President Clinton would not face
incarceration as the loser in a civil suit, Jones concluded that his impeachment analogy lacked any logical
basis.
C. Jones's Need for Immediate Relief
President Clinton and the Solicitor General contended that Jones's claim lacked any urgency sufficient
to outweigh the public's need for a Chief Executive wholly focused on his duties. They pointed out that Jones
waited three years to file, and they claimed that her evidence would not become any more stale if she must
wait a few years more. Clinton further noted that Jones could be compensated for her delay by interest paid
on any damages she eventually might receive.
In addition, Clinton contended that Jones filed her suit merely to achieve notoriety, rather than to satisfy
an urgent need for redress. As evidence, he cited Jones's frequent media appearances since filing her case.
Accordingly, Clinton concluded that Jones's claim contained no justifications that would outweigh the need
to preserve both the President's concentration and the proper separation of powers.
In rebuttal, Jones explained that a defamatory article in The American Spectator magazine, which did
not appear until January, 1994, finally compelled her to go public. Jones further noted that women who have
been sexually harassed face significant emotional obstacles to leveling their charges. To support her claim,
Jones quoted a 1992 speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in which the First Lady characterized sexual
harassment victims as frequently unsure of where to turn for help.
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Jones further contended that because President Clinton could remain in office for up to six more years,
she does face a substantial risk of evidence going stale. Moreover, she noted that no precedent exists for
penalizing litigants who file at the end of a statute of limitations instead of on the first day.
Supporting Jones, the ACLU argued that although a delay in money damages could be offset by paying
interest, plaintiffs who have been defamed suffer mounting injury to their good names every day. As Jones
alleged defamation, the ACLU concluded, her claim must be heard by the court at once. Also supporting
Jones, the professors pointed out that there is no way to know what Jones's motives really are. They further
argued that a plaintiffs motives are irrelevant and if Jones's claim has merit, she deserves the same right to
a speedy trial afforded to everyone else.
D. Alternatives to Absolute Temporary Immunity
As an alternative to dismissing Jones's claim on immunity grounds-Clinton suggested that the court
simply stay her suit until he leaves office. Only a complete stay adequately would protect the presidency,
Clinton added, claiming that ongoing discovery would present the same distractions as an actual trial. He
noted that the United States Supreme Court has deemed stays appropriate when the public welfare or
convenience demanded them. Clinton further acknowledged the Supreme Court's admonition that to prevail,
a party requesting a stay must make out a clear case of hardship or inequity. Due to the threat posed to his
ability to govern, the President concluded, his request amply satisfied the Supreme Court's requirements.
The Solicitor General concurred with the President's alternative request, arguing that a presumptive stay
would protect the Presidency while also protecting the plaintiff A claimant could rebut the presumptive stay
by showing that delay would seriously prejudice her interests and the case would not seriously hamper the
President's ability to govern, he continued. Moreover, he noted that a stay precludes the possibility that a
statute of limitations would expire before the litigant could refile. Arguing that Jones had failed to show that
delay would seriously prejudice her rights, the Solicitor General deemed a stay to be the correct course in the
current case.
On behalf of Jones, the law professors advocated an opposite approach from that of the Solicitor
General: a rebuttable presumption that a civil suit will go forward. Drawing on their analysis of the
separation of powers cases, they asserted that a President must show specifically how a suit would imperil
his ability to function as Chief Executive. If he did so, they agreed that the unique demands of the Presidency
could compel a court to grant him relief. The professors concluded, however, that Clinton had failed to show
specifically why the Jones case would affect his ability to function.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION
On December 28, 1994, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granted
President Clinton "temporary immunity from trial." In doing so, the court denied Clinton's motion for
dismissal on absolute immunity grounds with leave to refile, choosing instead to stay actual trial until he
leaves office. Nonetheless, the court allowed discovery and depositions to proceed without delay, including
depositions of the President himself. In so deciding, the court not only culled arguments from almost 300
pages of memoranda, but also pursued its own line of research.
A. "[E]ven the sovereign is subject to God and the Law."
In denying absolute immunity, the court agreed that Nixon v. Fitzgerald's holding could not serve as
controlling precedent. Fitzgerald involved a sitting President acting in his official capacity, the court
observed, while Jones's allegations arose before Clinton ever assumed office. In the absence of controlling
precedent, the court turned primarily to independent historical analysis upon which to premise a conclusion.
Specifically, the court discussed at length the historical struggle of the English people to wrest legal
rights from the Crown. The court cited the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right and the 1689 Parliamentary
Bill of Rights as exemplifying how the English citizenry secured for themselves rights hitherto reserved for
the Sovereign. Quoting Lord Coke, the court concluded that these victories established the principle that
"[t]he King ought to be under no man, but under God and the law." Thus, the English people in practice
relegated "the King can do no wrong" to the theoretical rubbish heap reserved for theories that outlive their
relevance.
Just as England steered away from the divine right of kings, the court asserted, so did America turn from
eighteenth-century views holding the President absolutely immune from civil process. The court accepted
Clinton's view that many influential framers envisioned a President immune from judicial process. But it
subsequently concluded that the executive branch lost its hold on complete independence when Marbury v.
Madison established judicial review just a few years later in 1803. The court further noted, as did Jones, that
Marshall enforced a subpoena duces tecum against President Jefferson just four years after that. Thus,
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according to the court, the Chief Executive's amenability to judicial process took root in America just as it
had in England.
In sum, the court concluded that the founders' greatest legacy consists of placing no one above the law.
The court conceded that the Fitzgerald decision unequivocally awarded the President absolute immunity from
damages suits based on official acts. The court, however, interpreted the broader swath of English and
American legal history as teaching that not even the Chief Executive can escape judicial oversight on a
broader scale. To believe otherwise, it asserted, would be "contrary to our form of government, which asserts
as did the English that even the sovereign is subject to God and the law." Accordingly, the court denied the
President's motion to dismiss on absolute immunity grounds.
B. "Unique risks to the effective functioning of government"
Although Clinton's argumerits failed to secure him inmuiiity, they noritheless persuaded the court to
stay actual trial until he leaves office. In fact, the court left Clinton's interpretation of Fitzgeralds reasoning
virtually unchallenged.
First, the court concurred that the Fitzgerald majority branded any suit against the President a threat to
the "effective functioning of government." In doing so, it rejected the professors' analysis that only a
President's ability to make difficult official decisions concerned the Fitzgerald Court. The court further
agreed that civil litigation similarly would imperil the President's ability to govern regardless of when the
claim arose. Finally, it accepted Clinton's conclusion that one suit would spawn others, thereby multiplying
the demands on his time. Thus, the court held the Supreme Court's concerns equally applicable to Paula
Jones's claims based on private conduct as to Fitzgeralds claims based on official acts.
Clinton also persuaded the court that Jones possessed no need for immediate relief. The court
characterized Jones's three-year delay in coming forward as evidence she "was in no rush to get her case to
court." Although it accepted Jones's explanation that the January, 1994, American Spectator article finally
compelled her to come forward, this explanation failed to have a mitigating effect. The court concluded that
Clinton's alleged sexual improprieties could not have caused Jones immediate harm if she needed this
additional compulsion to demand relief.
After analyzing both Clinton's interest in delaying the trial and Jones's interest in proceeding quickly,
the court balanced the two to reach its result: the public's need for an undistracted Chief Executive
outweighed Jones's desire for quick vindication. Accordingly, the court stayed trial proceedings until
President Clinton leaves office.
Specifically, the court held a stay to be within "the equity powers of the Court." In so doing, it accepted
Clinton's argument that the facts of the case satisfied the United States Supreme Court's standards for
granting a stay. The court did not discuss, however, the professors' contrary assertion that the President must
set forth specific grounds of how defending against Jones's claims would disrupt his ability to govern. Thus,
it implicitly concluded such a showing to be unnecessary.
C. "This does not mean, however, that the case is put on the shelf."
Despite granting Clinton a stay from actual trial, the court nonetheless held that discovery could proceed.
The court rejected the President's assertion that discovery posed the same threat to his effectiveness as would
an actual trial. While stating no reasons for disregarding the President's claim, the court explicitly concurred
with Jones's concern that a stay would render her evidence stale or even inaccessible. Accordingly, the court
allowed discovery, even depositions of the President, to proceed.
Thus, temporary immunity from trial emerged into judicial existence. In sum, this new doctrine consists
of three components. First, the President receives no immunity for suits based on private conduct. Second,
the court will stay actual trial until the President leaves office when the plaintiff fails to make a compelling
case for immediate relief. Finally, the court will allow discovery to proceed while the actual trial is on hold.
With the District Court's decision in Jones v. Clinton a matter of record, the focus now shifts to the parties'
appeals to the Eighth Circuit.
IV. THE CHALLENGE FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Temporary immunity from trial inadequately resolves the issue of whether the President is amenable to
civil suits based on his private conduct. The court opted for a carefully crafted compromise, but in doing so
created a doctrine that is self-contradictory. Because of its contradictions, temporary immunity from trial fails
to vindicate either of the competing interests advanced in Jones v. Clinton and therefore should be
substantively revised on appeal.
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A. Temporary Immunity from Trial as a Contradictory Doctrine
In sum, each of the three elements comprising temporary immunity from trial effectively undercuts the
element that preceded it. In denying the President's immunity request, the court declared that not even the
Chief Executive stands above the law. But by subsequently granting the President a presumptive stay, the
court accomplishes defacto what it refused to do explicitly.
The court failed to require President Clinton to present specific national priorities that Jones's suit would
imperil. Instead, it merely accepted Clinton's generalized concern that the suit would prove impermissibly
distracting. In other words, Clinton won his stay merely because he is the President. As he is required to
show nothing more than proof of identity, the stay is thus presumptive. Although the Jones v. Clinton
decision leaves open the possibility that a more compelling plaintiff than Paula Jones might rebut a
presumptive stay, the-plaintiff nonetheless-bears-the burden of proving the need for immediate relief.
From the Presidents point of view, a presumptive stay has the same desired outcome as would temporary
immunity. It relieves him of the intense political embarrassment that defending against the merits of a sexual
harassment claim would cause. Thus, in practical terms, a presumptive stay is simply "immunity by any other
name." And to the President, it would surely smell as sweet.
Finally, by allowing discovery to proceed even though the trial cannot, the court undercuts what it has
just accomplished with a presumptive stay. In granting the stay, the court accepted Clinton's argument that
legal entanglement would impermissibly distract him from governing. To permit discovery just a few
paragraphs later, the court presumably concluded that depositions, interrogatories and document requests
would not prove as burdensome a distraction as would the actual trial. The court offered no support for this
conclusion. But given discovery's importance to the settlement of civil claims, this conclusion is highly
questionable.
Due to its internal contradictions, temporary immunity from trial fails to vindicate either of the competing
interests advanced in Jones v. Clinton. By endorsing a presumptive stay, the court fails in practice to render
the President answerable for his private conduct. By allowing discovery to proceed, it fails to adequately
shield the President from the distraction as well.
B. Presumptive Amenability to Suit as an Alternative Approach
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit should revamp temporary immunity from trial
to accomplish effectively one objective or the other. This revision should take the form of presumptive
amenability to suit. Precedent and philosophy argue persuasively that the President enjoys no immunity from
civil damages suits predicated upon private acts. Thus, such suits presumptively should go forward. Courts
must still reserve the power to grant a stay, however, when the President can show that specific and
immediate national priorities demand his full attention. Moreover, a stay, when granted, should last only as
long as the immediate priority does, not necessarily until the end of the President's term. Finally, to shield
the president adequately, a stay must halt proceedings in their entirety.
1. Supreme Court Precedent Denies Presidential Immunity from Civil Suits Based on Private Conduct
The district court's interpretation of historical precedent and the founders' legacy offers a compelling
argument for denying President Clinton's absolute temporary immunity request. Furthermore, a careful
interpretation of United States Supreme Court precedent also supports this result. Simply put, the Supreme
Court never intended its absolute immunity cloak to cover unofficial acts as well as official ones. This
intention manifests itself in the plain language of the Court's holdings, their subsequent interpretation by
lower courts and counsel and in Fitzgeralds concurring and dissenting opinions.
Each holding from Bradley v. Fisher to Nixon v. Fitzgerald specifically limits immunity to suits based
on official conduct. More specifically, each holding limits immunity to actions taken "within the outer
perimeter" of the official's authority, including the President's authority. Thus, the Court not only refused
to preclude suits based on private conduct, but also refused to preclude suits involving official overreaching.
The Court's narrowly tailored holdings illustrate its intent to avoid a broader preclusion.
Alternatively, one could venture that the Court limited its holding to official conduct merely because of
the facts before it: each plaintiff alleged wrongs based on an official act. Thus, the Court had no need to
couch its holdings in broader terms. If one accepts that the Fitzgerald Court based its holding on the belief
that civil suits place unacceptable demands on the Presidents time, however, this alternative conclusion rests
on tenuous ground.
As President Clinton pointed out in his arguments, a suit based on private conduct would place the same
demands on his time as a suit based on official acts. As obvious as this observation is, it is doubtful that it
could have eluded the Fitzgerald Court. Yet in light of this inescapable observation, the Fitzgerald Court
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still crafted a narrow holding limited to official acts. Thus, the Court must have intended to limit Fitzgeralds
scope to official acts, even in light of its general concerns regarding demands on the President's time.
The lower courts recognized this limited scope for lesser officials by holding them accountable for
private actions, even though they possessed absolute immunity for their official actions. In the case ofjudges,
for example, the Court granted absolute immunity in 1871 for official acts within the scope of the judges'
jurisdiction. Since then, however, litigants have repeatedly sued judges for actions taken in private life.
Professor Gray cites two reported cases in which judges paid damages for malicious prosecution and a third
in which ajudge was held liable for flood damages caused by a leaky dam on his property. Thus, the lower
courts translated the theoretically limited nature of absolute immunity into practice.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald expressly distinguished the unique importance
of the President'sjob from that of lesser-officials. Following this reasoning, President Clinton concluded that
the limits placed on absolute immunity for lesser officials should not apply to the President. This conclusion,
however, denies the purpose behind the Fitzgerald Court's observation.
By distinguishing the President from lesser officials, the Court sought to justify granting him absolute
immunity while denying the same shield to his underlings. Just a few years earlier, in Scheuer v. Rhodes and
Butz v. Economou, the Court awarded state and other federal officials only qualified immunity from suits
based on their official acts. Because of the President's unique status, however, the Court held "these cases
to be inapposite." Thus, the Court intended solely to distinguish Scheuer and Butz. Correspondingly, the
Justices never intended to create a different grade of absolute immunity available only to the President.
Lawyers defending the other three Presidents sued for unofficial conduct implicitly acknowledged the
limited scope of the Supreme Court's immunity doctrine. In none of these cases did counsel raise immunity
as a defense. Yet the Court's holding in Spalding v. Vilas, which established absolute immunity for cabinet
officers, could well have launched an argument to extend the identical protection to their boss. Nonetheless,
President Kennedy's attorneys, for example, argued for dismissal of a motor vehicle tort based on the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act, not on immunity grounds.
Finally, the Fitzgerald concurrence and dissent reveal a majority opposed to extending absolute
immunity to a President's unofficial acts. The four Justices endorsing the plurality opinion did not address
the issue. But Chief Justice Burger, writing in concurrence, did so in no uncertain terms: "[A] President, like
Members of Congress, judges, prosecutors, or congressional aides-all having absolute immunity--are not
immune for acts outside official duties." Thus, the Chief Justice endorsed absolute immunity only when the
President acts in an official capacity.
The remaining four Justices, arguing in dissent, opposed broad absolute immunity for even a President's
official acts. They contended that the President deserved absolute protection only when engaged in
particularly sensitive functions. As in the plurality opinion, the dissenters did not discuss immunity for
private conduct per se. Given their opposition to broad immunity for official acts, however, it seems highly
unlikely they would reverse their convictions to support similarly broad immunity for private conduct.
Thus, five out of nine justices opposed absolute immunity for damages suits based on unofficial acts.
Chief Justice Burger and the four dissenters comprise the majority, with the remaining four Justices
expressing no discernable opinion. This analysis of the Fitzgerald opinion, along with the plain language of
the Court's immunity holdings and subsequent lower court interpretation, reveals a weight of precedent
opposed to President Clinton's request.
2. Precedent and Pragmatism Counsel a Rebuttable Presumption that Suits Against the President Go
Forward
The courts presumptively can permit suits against the President to proceed and still intervene to protect
the national interest when necessary. In contrast, the presumptive stay alternative simply grants the President
absolute temporary immunity by any other name. Like immunity, it shelters the President from judicial
process merely because of the office he holds. Therefore, the same precedent that denies presidential
immunity from civil suits based on private conduct likewise denies a presumptive stay. Simply attaching a
different label to the same end result is at best judicial sleight of hand. At worst, it amounts to thinly veiled
circumvention of the law.
On the other hand, a blanket refusal to stay suits against the President under any circumstances defies
pragmatism. The nation sometimes does face dire emergencies requiring all the President's waking energies.
As the President is the Chief Executive, no one else can fill his shoes in these times of crisis. When he must
provide such leadership, the national interest demands that partisan posturing, fund raising and photo
opportunities all take a back seat to the problem at hand. Likewise, the national interest demands that one
litigant's plea for redress take a back seat with them.
58
To offer an example, assume the injured motorist had pressed his claim against President Kennedy during
the Cuban Missile Crisis. Having the President put Premier Kruschev on hold to testify whether the light was
red or green simply makes no sense. One litigant's desire for immediate relief would take a back seat to the
immediate interests of the nation at large.
Fortunately, however, Cuban Missile Crises do not happen often. More commonly, the President's
workload involves day-to-day political tussles over balanced budget amendments, foreign aid and other
pending legislation. Although this work may shape the nation's future, the stakes at hand are not nearly so
immediate. Nor does the President play so pivotal a role. Key legislators, media pundits and the public at
large all participate in shaping the outcome. Moreover, the President finds time for fund raising, stumping
for candidates and photo opportunities in addition to his governmental duties.
Therefore, the-courts presumptively can permit suits against the President to proceed under ordinary
circumstances without impermissibly jeopardizing the national interest. To protect the national interest when
circumstances turn extraordinary, however, the President must be free to rebut the presumption and speedily
secure a stay. To do so, he need simply identify to the court's satisfaction the national imperative requiring
his complete attention.
Such a presumptive amenability to suit doctrine would serve both competing interests at stake in the
immunity debate. It remains true to precedent rendering the President answerable for his private conduct, as
is every other citizen. If the President were to fall victim to meritless "strike suits," he could secure quick
relief by a rule 12(b) (6) or summary judgement motion, just like every other citizen. Moreover, presumptive
amenability leaves ample room for judicial intervention to protect compelling national interests.
As the professors pointed out in their amicus brief, presumptive amenability to suits based on private
conduct stands in harmony with the Presidents amenability to criminal process. In United States v. Burr and
United States v. Nixon, Chief Justice Marshall and the United States Supreme Court, respectively, recognized
that the demands of the Presidency could well require immunity from criminal process. Likewise,
presumptive amenability recognizes that the demands of the Presidency may require staying a litigant's claim.
Both Marshall and the United States v. Nixon Court, however, held the President answerable absent a
specific showing that compliance would threaten the national interest. Likewise, presumptive amenability
would require the President to show a specific national priority that required all his waking energies. Thus,
presumptive amenability to suit comports with Supreme Court reasoning.
Empowering the courts to decide when national priorities demand a stay similarly comports with
Supreme Court immunity precedent. In United States v. Nixon, for example, the Supreme Court commanded
the district court to examine the Watergate tapes in-camera to ensure they contained no sensitive information.
In other words, the courts, not the President, were to determine whether national interests demanded some
passages remain unrevealed.
Similarly, the Fitzgerald Court limited presidential immunity to official acts "within the 'outer perimeter'
of his official responsibility." Implicit in the Fitzgerald doctrine is a mandate to the courts to decide how far
the President's outer perimeter of authority extends. As precedent awards the courts stewardship over
questions of national security and presidential authority, so would it empower the courts to decide when
national priorities demand staying a civil suit.
3. When National Priorities Warrant a Stay, They Warrant a Stay in Its Entirety
If the courts determine that a national priority demands all the President's energy, the courts must stay
civil suits against him completely. Staying trial but permitting discovery still subjects the President to
significant distractions. The importance discovery plays in contemporary civil litigation supports this
observation.
In a hotly contested case, the battle is often won or lost in discovery, an observation supported by the
fact that the lion's share of civil claims are settled before ever reaching trial. Thus, a civil litigant must devote
the same care to preparing the factual record in discovery as he would to preparing actual testimony.
Moreover, as the temporary immunity from trial doctrine permits depositions of the President himself he
cannot delegate the discovery tasks to subordinates. His first-hand participation inexorably would be
required.
In addition, each discovery motion and each inevitable objection could generate the same embarrassing
headlines that a day of trial testimony would. The President would escape neither distraction nor political
damage. Thus, staying trial while permitting discovery proves an empty gesture, devoid of practical
significance to the Chief Executive.
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Admittedly, staying discovery risks allowing evidence to grow stale. This could place the plaintiff at a
disadvantage once the stay is lifted. But courts can mitigate this risk somewhat by limiting the stay's duration.
A stay need not last until the end of the Presidents tenure, but only until the immediate national emergency
passes.
In cases of prolonged national crisis, however, the President could justify staying discovery for long
periods of time. As time wore on, the risk of losing evidence would increase. But as more than 120 years of
immunity case law teaches, one litigant's desire for redress must at times give way to the national interest.
To remain grounded in pragmatism, a presumptive amenability doctrine cannot preserve all litigant's rights
all the time. It should, however, permit their forfeiture only when absolutely necessary to advance an
immediate national priority.
In addition, the risk of losing evidence would cut both ways.-In other words, the defendant-President runs
the same risk of losing exculpatory evidence while the stay is in effect. So although the risks of stale evidence
become no more desirable, both parties at least face a level playing field.
V. CONCLUSION
Paula Corbin Jones's sexual harassment suit against President Clinton raises a novel issue for the courts:
is a sitting President entitled to absolute temporary immunity from civil damages suits based on actions that
occurred before he took office? The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
concluded that the President enjoys a "temporary immunity from trial," consisting of a presumptive stay of
trial proceedings until Clinton leaves office. The great weight of precedent and history, however, counsels
that Presidents should be amenable to suits based on private conduct, unless a compelling national priority
demands the Chief Executive's full and immediate attention. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit should replace temporary immunity from trial with a doctrine of presumptive amenability
to suit. A presumptive amenability standard serves both competing interests that shape the presidential
immunity debate: it preserves intact the philosophical maxim that "no man is above the law," but also
preserves flexibility to protect the national interest in times of crisis. In sum, presumptive amenability to suit
offers the most balanced answer to this newest immunity question.
Copyright (c) 1995 by the Boston College Law Review
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CLINTON HIRES LAWYER
AS SEXUAL HARASSMENT SUIT IS THREATENED
Former State Employee in Arkansas Alleges Improper Advance in 1991
The Washington Post
Wednesday, May 4, 1994
Michael Isikoff, Charles E. Shepard, Sharon LaFraniere, Staff Writers
On Feb. 11, former Arkansas state clerical
worker Paula Jones appeared at a Washington news
conference and accused Bill Clinton of making an
unwanted and improper sexual advance during a
brief encounter in a Little Rock hotel room in 1991.
As Jones told it, a state trooper serving on
then-Gov. Clinton's security detail summoned her to
meet Clinton while she was working at a
state-sponsored conference where he was speaking.
Alone with her, Jones said, Clinton tried to kiss her,
reached under her clothing and asked her to perform
a sexual act. She said she felt humiliated and walked
out within minutes.
Asked by reporters to respond, White House
aides said the story was untrue and described it as a
cheap political trick engineered by avowed Clinton
enemy Cliff Jackson, who had helped arrange
Jones's news conference at a gathering of political
conservatives. They said Clinton had no memory of
meeting the woman.
Clinton's new attorney, Robert S. Bennett, said
yesterday, "This event, plain and simple, didn't
happen." Clinton has retained Bennett as his
personal attorney to defend against a threatened
lawsuit this week by Jones.
Over the past three months, The Washington
Post has interviewed Jones extensively about what
she said happened in Little Rock's Excelsior Hotel.
She said she was alone with Clinton in the room --
making it impossible to independently resolve what,
if anything, happened between them.
Jones, who now lives in California, provided the
names of two longtime friends and two family
members who said in interviews that Jones had told
them about the May 8, 1991, episode the day it
occurred. One of the friends, a co-worker at the
conference, said she witnessed the trooper's
approach. Jones's then-boyfriend, Steve Jones, now
her husband, said she told him at the time that
Clinton had made a pass at her.
Three Arkansas state troopers have said in
published accounts and in recent interviews with
The Post that Clinton used them and other members
of his state security detail to solicit women to whom
he was attracted, although none was on duty on the
day-Jones alleges she met with Clinton.
Key aspects of Jones's account are a departure
from past allegations about Clinton's personal
conduct Jones worked for an Arkansas state agency,
and she contends that Clinton's conduct toward her
constituted sexual harassment of an employee. No
woman has ever publicly accused Clinton of
workplace harassment or the extreme behavior that
Jones recounts.
"What she alleges is simply inconceivable as
Clinton behavior," said Betsey Wright, Clinton's
former chief of staff in Arkansas who helped his
1992 presidential campaign combat allegations of
extramarital affairs.
Aides to Clinton have suggested that, aside
from political motivation, Jones could be seeking
financial gain, and her attorney has acknowledged
that before her news conference he made an effort to
negotiate an out-of-court monetary settlement in
exchange for her silence. Yesterday Bennett accused
Jones's attorney of seeking a job for Jones in return
for her silence.
The first account of a story involving Paula
Jones appeared in the January issue of the
conservative American Spectator magazine. The
article quoted an unnamed trooper who said he
approached a woman named "Paula" on Clinton's
behal then stood guard outside a hotel room while
Clinton met with her. The trooper said in the
account that she told him, as she left the room after
less than an hour, that she was willing to be
Clinton's girlfriend.
The trooper, later identified as Danny Ferguson,
has refused since Jones's news conference to discuss
the American Spectator article. He declined again
last week to be interviewed.
Jones has said it was indignation over that
article and what she said was the untrue depiction of
her encounter with Clinton that caused her to speak
out. Her attorney, Daniel Traylor of Little Rock,
said Jones had to go public because Clinton
indirectly had declined private appeals Traylor made
for a public clarification of the American Spectator
story. Traylor later confirmed that he did not know
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whether such an appeal had actually reached the
White House.
Jones's allegations revolve around the 1991
Governor's Quality Conference, a one-day session
on management for manufacturing executives and
government officials held at the 19-story Excelsior
Hotel at the edge of downtown Little Rock.
Then 44, Clinton was in his fifth term as
governor. Already considered a possible Democratic
candidate for the presidency, he had just returned
from a well-received appearance before the national
Democratic Leadership Council. He was five
months from announcing his candidacy.
At the registration desk outside the hotel
ballroom, Jones (then Paula Corbin) and a
co-worker she had known since childhood, Pam
Blackard, were handing out name tags and literature.
Jones, then 24, had been hired two months earlier as
a $10,270-a-year clerk for the Arkansas Industrial
Development Commission, a job that required
regular visits to the governor's office in the capitol.
The job was the highlight of her resume: After
secretarial classes at a junior college, she had held a
string of office and sales positions, none for more
than nine months.
Jones described herself in interviews as
sometimes too trusting and a talkative and outgoing
person. "A lot of people take that as being a flirt,"
she said. "That's just me though. I like people, and
I like to talk to people.... It doesn't matter if it's a
man or woman."
At some point during the day of the conference,
Jones said, she noticed Clinton standing nearby,
answering questions from reporters. Jones, who had
never met Clinton, said she thought he was staring
at her. A few minutes later, she said, trooper
Ferguson, a member of Clinton's security detail with
whom she had chatted earlier, approached the table
and told her, "The governor said you make his knees
knock."
She said Ferguson returned a short time later, at
about 2:30, and handed her a piece of paper with a
room number written on it. "The governor would
like to meet you up in his room and talk to you ...
in a few minutes," Ferguson said.
Jones said she had recognized the suggestive
flavor of Ferguson's "knees knock" comment, but
reacted to his words as a compliment, not a
come-on. She said she had no reason to expect what
she said happened later. "I was brought up to trust
people and especially of that stature -- you know, a
governor." Jones said she hoped the meeting might
yield a better-paying job in Clinton's office.
Clinton's schedule for that day, provided by the
White House last week after repeated requests,
shows the governor scheduled for "phone time"
between 2:15 and 2:30 that afternoon after a
luncheon and videotaping at the governor's mansion.
The schedule indicates Clinton had the option of
returning to the quality conference between 2:30 and
4 p.m. Conference organizers had asked Clinton to
attend as much of the day as possible.
-- -After Jones's news conference, a White House
aide said her account could not be true and referred
The Post to Phil Price, Gov. Clinton's senior
assistant for economic development in 1991 and
now Arkansas' assistant bank commissioner. Price
said he is convinced Clinton did not return to the
Excelsior that afternoon because he does not
remember returning himself and he was Clinton's
designated staff member for such conferences. But
management consultant James Harrington, the
featured conference speaker after lunch, said he
talked to and saw Clinton that afternoon. "He was
milling about, meeting people, saying hello," he
said.
Jones said she followed Ferguson upstairs, and
the trooper stayed in the hallway. Clinton met her at
the door, she said. She said the room was furnished
as a parlor and had no bed.
After asking her about her job, she said, Clinton
took her hand. She said she pulled it away, and tried
to distract him by chatting about Clinton's wife. But,
she said, he persisted, kissing her neck and putting
his hand on her thigh underneath her culotte.
Jones said she objected, asking Clinton: "What's
going on?" She said he told her he had noticed her
downstairs and liked the curves of her body and the
way her black hair flowed down her back. "I will
never forget the look on his face," she said. "His
face was just red, beet red."
Asked why she didn't leave the room, she said:
"I guess I didn't know what to do. This is the
governor, this is not just anyone. I feel
intimidated .. . by anybody that's higher than me. I
feel I've got to do everything possible not to make
them upset at me. I've always been like that."
Jones said she walked to the far end of a sofa
and sat down, averting her eyes. The next thing she
knew, she said, Clinton had dropped his trousers
and underwear and was sitting next to her on the
couch. Then, she said, he asked her to perform oral
sex.
"I jumped up and I said, 'No, I don't do that. I'm
not that type of person. I need to be going back
downstairs,' " Jones recalled saying. Clinton, she
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said, tried to reassure her that she would not be in
trouble with her boss if she stayed, but she left the
room. As she was leaving, she said, Clinton asked
her not to mention the episode to anyone.
She said she passed Ferguson in the hallway
without speaking, and returned to the table where
Blackard still sat downstairs. She estimated she had
been gone for no more than 15 minutes.
In an interview, Blackard said she had seen
Clinton staring at. Jones,- watched the trooper ask
Jones to meet Clinton, and talked with her about
whether to go. "I did say to her ... 'Find out what he
wants and come right back. . . . If you're that
curious, go ahead,' " Blackard recalled saying.
When she returned, Blackard said, Jones was
"walking fast" and "shaking." She said Jones told
her that Clinton had made unwanted advances and
Jones implored her to tell no one. "We were both
kind of scared," Blackard recalled. "We weren't
thinking straight. I thought I could lose my job. She
thought she could lose her job." In an interview,
Jones said that at the time she feared she would be
fired for leaving the registration desk or because her
refusal might have angered Clinton, who as
governor appointed her boss.
Another friend, Debra Ballentine, said Jones
showed up unexpectedly at her office late that
afternoon and told her the story. Jones trembled and
"was breathing really hard," said Ballentine, who
has known Jones about six years and is a marketing
coordinator for a large Little Rock company.
Ballentine said Jones "couldn't believe she was so
stupid" for going upstairs.
Before Jones's news conference, both Ballentine
and Blackard signed affidavits supporting Jones's
account after conferences in the office of Jones's
attorney, Traylor. The Post interviewed both women
subsequently.
Jones's two sisters said they talked to Jones that
evening at their homes outside Little Rock.
Charlotte Brown said her younger sister told her in
a "matter of fact" way that Clinton had
propositioned her. Lydia Cathey, now 29 and closer
in age to Jones, said she ushered her sister into her
bedroom, shut the door and comforted her sister as
she cried on the bed.
One voice silent in the Paula Jones controversy
is that of trooper Ferguson, who now guards
Clinton's successor in the Arkansas governor's
mansion, Jim Guy Tucker (D). "I am not going to
say anything about it," Ferguson told The Post after
Jones's February news conference. "I have to think
about my family."
Other troopers said Ferguson told them about
soliciting a woman at the Excelsior soon afterward
and again last summer, when he and three other
members of the Arkansas governor's security detail
began talking among themselves about experiences
with Clinton, including times they say they had
sought out women on the governor's behalf.
One story Ferguson told involved a woman
named "Paula," according to the troopers. Trooper
Roger Perry told The Post he heard Ferguson tell
how Clinton had noticed "Paula" at the Excelsior
and had described her as having "that come-hither
look." Perry said in an interview that Ferguson, at
Clinton's request, arranged to get a room, telling the
hotel Clinton expected a call from the White House.
Last summer several of the troopers, looking for
a book deal, enlisted the help of Little Rock attorney
Cliff Jackson, who has worked for years to discredit
Clinton politically. Eager to get maximum impact,
he arranged for the troopers to talk to reporters for
the American Spectator and the Los Angeles Times.
The Spectator article, released in late
December, quoted an unidentified trooper as saying
that he had recruited "Paula" at Clinton's request
and stood guard outside the hotel room for "no more
than an hour." The magazine also reported that the
trooper recalled "Paula" saying as she exited that
"she was available to be Clinton's regular girlfriend
if he so desired" -- a remark at odds with Jones's
story. Fellow troopers told The Post that Ferguson
had told them "Paula" was willing to be Clinton's
girlfriend.
Jones said she learned about the Spectator
article from her friend Ballentine during a visit to
Arkansas last January. Jones said she felt humiliated
by the magazine's description of her encounter with
Clinton and believed that some of her friends and
family would conclude that she was the "Paula"
described in the article. She said she wanted to
"clear my name."
Jones said she did not accuse Clinton during the
1992 campaign, when his conduct with women was
at issue, because she still worked for the state and
was convinced no one would believe her.
The day after Jones said she learned about the
American Spectator article, Jones and Ballentine
recalled, they ran into Ferguson at a restaurant in the
Little Rock area. Jones said she asked Ferguson if
he had been the magazine's source. Ferguson
became apologetic, according to both Jones and
Ballentine.
According to the two women, Ferguson said he
had been dragged into the interview with the
Spectator by the other troopers. They said he added
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that no one would know who Jones was because he
hadn't disclosed her last name and, "besides, Clinton
told me you wouldn't do anything anyway."
Jones said she had several more contacts with
Ferguson and Clinton before she left her state job in
February 1993. Once, she said, she ran into
Ferguson, who told her Clinton had been asking
about her, wanted her home phone number and was
interested in seeing her. Jones, who was living with
the man she would marry in December 1991, said
she refused.
Jones saw Clinton two more times before she
left the Arkansas Industrial Development
Commission, she said. Once she got a brief hello.
The other time, in fall 1991, she said, Clinton called
out to her under the rotunda of the Arkansas capitol.
He was accompanied by another bodyguard, Lany
Patterson, one of the three troopers who has publicly
accused Clinton of womanizing. Patterson said in an
interview he recalls the encounter as Jones does.
After Clinton spotted her, Jones said, Clinton
called out her name and walked over. Then, she said,
"he squeezed me up close to him," her side to his.
She said he tumed with a smile to Patterson, his arm
still around her shoulder, and said to Patterson:
"Don't we make a beautiful couple? Beauty and the
-Beast."
She said she replied, "Well, you don't look like
the Beast." And with that, she said, Clinton bid
goodbye, saying, "It was nice to see you, Paula."
The Washington Post Copyright 1994
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SUIT ACCUSES PRESIDENT OF ADVANCE
The New York Times
Saturday, May 7, 1994
Stephen Labaton, Special to The New York Times
A former Arkansas state employee sued
President Clinton today, accusing him of making an
unwanted sexual advance while he was Governor in
1991.
Lawyers for the former employee, Paula Corbin
Jones, filed the lawsuit in Federal District Court
here with great fanfare this morning, accusing Mr.
Clinton of making the advance in a Little Rock hotel
room during a state-sponsored conference. In her
lawsuit, which included a graphic and detailed
account of what she called a "repugnant" episode,
Ms. Jones said she spurned Mr. Clinton's advance
and was later transferred to another state job as
punishment.
Her suit charged Mr. Clinton with violating a
Federal civil rights law that dates from the
Reconstruction Era. Ms. Jones did not file a
standard sexual harassment suit under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Right Act because the period allowed
by law for such action had expired.
As corroboration, the complaint asserted that
Ms. Jones described the incident to several other
people immediately after it happened. Two of them,
Pamela Blackard and Debra Ballentine, said in
interviews in The Washington Post on Wednesday
that Ms. Jones had told them of the encounter
immediately afterward. Neither of them responded
to repeated messages or attempts to contact them
this week.
LAWSUIT DENOUNCED BY CLINTON
In Washington, the lawyer Mr. Clinton hired
early this week to handle the case, Robert B.
Bennett, immediately denounced the lawsuit as
"tabloid trash with a legal caption on it." He said the
President had never propositioned Ms. Jones and
had no recollection of ever having met her.
"The President adamantly denies the vicious and
mean-spirited allegations in this complaint," Mr.
Bennett said at a crowded news conference at his
office two blocks from the White House. "Quite
simply, the incident did not occur."
Asked about the suit later at a brief photo
session at the White House, Mr. Clinton said: "I
have nothing to add to what Bennett said. I'm going
back to work. I'm not going to dignify this by
commenting on it." White House aides said that
the lawsuit was a dirty trick intended to help
conservative organizations raise money and that Ms.
Jones had filed it for financial gain, if not from the
lawsuit, then from book sales, movie rights and
television royalties.
.-Still, the.aides.have privately voiced concern
that the suit could revive accusations made during
the 1992 campaign about Mr. Clinton's character
and undermine his credibility, which some polls
indicate has suffered from the investigation into his
personal and campaign finances.
In a statement one of her lawyers read in front
of the courthouse here today to the throng of
reporters and cameramen who had been waiting for
the lawsuit all week, Ms. Jones denied that she was
motivated by money. As proof, her lawyer said, she
vowed to donate any judgment, less expenses, to a
Little Rock charity he did not identify.
"This case is not about money," Ms. Jones said
in her statement, which was read by Joseph
Cammarata, one of two lawyers who was called in
from Fairfax, Va., to handle the lawsuit after several
more-prominent lawyers declined to represent her.
"This case is about character and integrity. This case
is about the powerful taking advantage of the weak.
This case is about my name and my reputation in the
eyes of my family, my young son and my
community. This case is about justice."
In her statement, Ms. Jones also said she wished
to clear her own name. Her complaint cited an
article in The American Spectator in January that
accused Mr. Clinton of using his state trooper
security detail to help arrange sexual encounters.
The article described a woman named only as Paula
as having told a trooper that she had had sex with
Mr. Clinton in a hotel room.
ACTION TERMED UNPRECEDENTED
Washington lawyers said that the lawsuit was
without precedent in modern times and that they
could not recount any instance in which a President
had been sued on the basis of what people said was
done before he took office. Presidents are often sued
by citizens but the complaints almost always
concern their official duties. In 1982, the Supreme
Court narrowly ruled that Presidents had absolute
immunity and could not be personally liable for
anything involving their official duties.
Harry C. McPherson, who was White House
counsel to President Lyndon B. Johnson, said he
could recall no action brought against Mr. Johnson
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or his two predecessors, John F. Kennedy and
Dwight D. Eisenhower. C. Boyden Gray, counsel to
George Bush when he was both President and Vice
President under Ronald Reagan, said he, too,
recalled no suits against either President for
personal actions before they took office.
Both Mr. Cammarata and Gilbert K Davis, the
two lawyers representing Ms. Jones, refused to
answer questions about who would be paying the
legal costs or how they got involved in the case. The
White House has said the costs of-defending the
lawsuit would be paid by the Clintons.
Ms. Jones, 27, grew up in Lonoke, Ark., a small
rural town about a 30-minute drive east of Little
Rock, where her father was a preacher in the Church
of Nazarene. After high school, she moved to Little
Rock, took secretarial classes at Capital City Junior
College and then held a string of office and sales
positions, none for more than nine months.
She now lives in Los Angeles with her husband,
Stephen Jones, an aspiring actor, and their young
son.
EARLIER ACCUSATION
She first made her accusation publicly in
February at a news conference sponsored by the
Conservative Political Action Conference, a political
group committed to opposing Mr. Clinton and his
policies.
Her lawsuit, which was filed on the last
business day before the statute of limitations for
such accusations would have expired, on Sunday,
spelled out her version of events in considerably
more detail than she did in February.
She said that, three years ago, she worked as a
clerk for the Arkansas Industrial Development
Commission. On May 8, 1991, she said she was
working at a state-sponsored conference - handing
out name tags and conference-related literature at
the Excelsior Hotel in Little Rock -- on management
for manufacturing executives and government
officials.
Mr. Clinton spoke at the conference. That
afternoon, Ms. Jones said, Mr. Clinton's bodyguard,
a state trooper named Danny Ferguson, handed her
a slip of paper with a four-digit suite number on it.
Then, she added, Mr. Ferguson said, "The Governor
would like to meet with you." Ms. Jones agreed to
go to Mr. Clinton's suite "because she thought it
might lead to an enhanced employment opportunity
with the state," the complaint said.
Moments later, Mr. Ferguson, who is also a
defendant in the lawsuit, escorted her to the room,
which was furnished like a business suite and
contained a couch and chairs but no bed, Ms. Jones
said. He left Mr. Clinton and Ms. Jones alone, she
said.
During a few minutes of small talk, Mr. Clinton
mentioned he was good friends with the director of
the commission, she said. Then, she said, he took
her hand and pulled her toward him. She removed
her hand and stepped back, she said. She quoted Mr.
Clinton as then saying: "I love the way your hair
flows down your back," and "I love your curves." He
put his hand on her leg, started sliding it toward the
- hem of her culottes and tried to kiss her on the neck,
she said.
Ms. Jones said she asked, "What are you
doing?" and tried to distract the Governor by
chatting with him about his wife. When Mr. Clinton
asked if she was married, Ms. Jones said she had
told him that she had a boyfriend. At that point,
according to the complaint, Mr. Clinton dropped his
pants and asked Ms. Jones to perform oral sex on
him.
Ms. Jones also said that, as she left the room,
Mr. Clinton told her: "You are smart. Let's keep this
between ourselves."
The lawsuit accused Mr. Clinton, who declared
his candidacy for President five months later, of
violating two Federal civil laws and two state civil
laws. It said he and Mr. Ferguson, the state trooper,
had violated Ms. Jones's constitutional rights under
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code,
had conspired to violate such constitutional rights
under Section 1985 of the same title, had
intentionally inflicted emotional distress, and had
defamed her by characterizing her as a liar and
questioning her motives.
Ms. Jones is seeking $75,000 in compensatory
damages and $100,000 in punitive damages on each
of the four counts.
One of Ms. Jones's sisters, Charlotte Brown,
suggested on Thursday that her sister was being
coached and would file the complaint to make
money. Appearing in an interview on Thursday on
KARK-TV in Little Rock, Ms. Brown said Ms.
Jones came to her house after the incident she
described and "seemed thrilled."
"She told me she went up to the room and seen
him, and she told me he made, you know, sexual
advances," Ms. Brown said. "She told me whichever
way it went, it smelt money."
Other family members, however, supported
Paula Jones's account and motivation.
Word of the planned lawsuit has been filtering
through Washington for weeks and prompted a
number of White House actions in anticipation. On
Wednesday, Mr. Bennett made public an affidavit
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that seeks to show that Ms. Jones and her Little
Rock lawyer, Daniel Traylor, had planned to sue
solely for financial gain.
THREAT IS PURPORTED
The affidavit, signed by a Little Rock
businessman, George L. Cook, said that before Ms.
Jones's initial disclosure of the incident, Mr. Traylor
tried to obtain money from the White House in
return for her silence.
"Traylor revealed that he represented Paula
Jones who said she had a claim against President
Clinton and, if she did not get money for it, she
would embarrass him publicly," the affidavit said. It
added that Mr. Traylor said that his claim was weak
but that he also said he needed the client and he
needed the money.
Mr. Bennett also repeated today the suggestion
he made earlier this week that Ms. Jones was being
manipulated by Mr. Clinton's political enemies, like
Cliff Jackson, a Little Rock lawyer and former
Oxford classmate of Mr. Clinton's who has spent
several years trying to turn up embarrassing
information about Mr. Clinton's private life.
In an interview on Wednesday, Mr. Jackson
denied that he had any role in persuading Ms. Jones
to accuse Mr. Clinton publicly of sexual harassment.
Mr.-Jackson said Mr. Bennett's comments about him
represented a personal attack instead of a response
to the issue.
"It's the same old predicable response," Mr.
Jackson said.
Copyright 1994 The New York Times Company
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IF CLINTON IS INNOCENT, WHY NOT PROCEED?
The Women's Movement Has Gone Into Hibernation Over the Paula Jones Case
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, June 25, 1996
Susan Carpenter Mcmillan, Column Right
Monday's Supreme Court decision to grant -
President Clinton a hearing concerning the sexual
harassment case being brought against him by Paula
Corbin Jones is indeed a defeat for Jones and her
attorneys. Yet it is just another step in Jones' long,
lonely fight for justice.
From the beginning, Jones has been fighting an
uphill battle. When she filed her suit in 1993, she,
like the rest of the nation, must have been stunned to
see the women's movement--previously the strong
opponent of sexual harassment-- go into hibernation
over her case, popping up only long enough to
complain about Republican elected officials like
Bob Packwood. Granted, in the eyes of liberal
feminists Jones was only a housewife and mother,
compared with the well-educated, articulate law
professor whom the feminists preferred to
champion. But that fact in itself should have been
titillating enough for the old war horses of the Anita
Hill crusade--like Rep. Pat Schroeder and National
Organization for Women leaders Patricia Ireland
and Molly Yard--to sound the rallying cry. Yet the
failure of those in the so-called women's movement
to afford Jones the same blind, unsubstantiated
support they gave Hill says more about their
character and sincerity than any book written on the
topic of hypocrisy.
Jones also had to struggle with the overtly
partisan media machine. The media went into their
cafeteria reporting mode: printing front-page stories
on Jones and her background that never would have
made the back page had they been about Hill, asking
probing questions concerning Jones' allegations that
would have been viewed as insensitive and
treasonous against Hill.
Clinton, on the other hand, used his energy, via
his lawyers, to engage in a new form of harassment,
this time aimed at justice. Going from sexual to
judicial harassment, Clinton first tried to place
himself above the law by daring to ask the court for
a delay while in office. Failing that, his lawyers
shamefully tried to use his position as commander in
chief of the military, citing a "while in service"
immunity clause in the law. Clinton claimed to be on
active duty. Most recently, Clinton's lawyers have
announced that two new attorneys have joined their
team, meaning a delay is necessary--no doubt past
November.
While Clinton supporters may argue that a
sitting president should not be sued for past
transgressions while in office, that argument is
undermined by the case of Spiro Agnew, who was
forced to resign as vice president in 1973 after
revelations of past corruption when he was governor
of Maryland. If Clinton is indeed innocent as he and
his supporters contend, then why not simply allow
Jones a speedy entry into the courtroom, where she
can present her facts and state her case? Then, if the
courts rule on behalf of the president, Jones will be
silenced, once and for all.
One would think that Clinton would be eager to
get into court and clear his name. On the other hand,
if the court finds the president guilty, then, to quote
Richard Nixon, "The people have a right to know if
their president is a crook." But none of this can
happen until discovery is allowed, depositions are
taken, stall tactics are ended and the wheels of
justice are able to pick up speed.
While critics say that Jones merely is being used
by the right, she has kept a low profile, giving few
interviews, rejecting the talk-show circuit and being
present only at press conferences that her lawyers
call. Is she merely tilting at windmills by suing a
man who she says exposed himself to her? Now that
the Supreme Court has spoken and the world can see
that Jones, though put off temporarily, will not
surrender or retreat, let the legal process proceed. As
Jones patiently awaits each new court decision, she
must find great solace in the words of Hillary
Rodham Clinton, who announced to the world after
Hill's charges at the Clarence Thomas confirmation
hearings that women do not lie when it comes to
harassment. If Jones can finally meet the man from
the Oval Office on a leveled playing field, she'll be
able to prove that.
Copyright 1996 Los Angeles Times
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CLINTON VS. JONES
The Tampa Tribune
Thursday, June 13, 1996
James J. Kilpatrick, Universal Press Syndicate
Precedent is the mother's milk of law. The
Supreme Court will set a sour one if it turns down
the appeal of William Jefferson Clinton from a
regrettable ruling of the 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals.
William Jefferson Clinton, of course, is
president of the United States. He is also the
defendant in a suit brought by Paula Corbin Jones.
She charges that on May 8, 1991, at a time when
Mr. Clinton was governor of Arkansas, he lured her
into a Little Rock hotel room. She says he exposed
himself and invited oral sex. The president fervently
denies everything.
The 8th Circuit ruled that the suit must go
forward while Mr. Clinton continues in office. If the
ruling stands up, it will set a dangerous precedent
for presidents in the future.
To some extent both the president and Mrs.
Jones rely upon Nixon vs. Fitzgerald, decided by the
Supreme Court in 1982. Ernest Fitzgerald was a
civil service analyst for the Air Force. In 1968 he
blew the whistle on cost overruns on the C-5A
transport. In 1970, Nixon personally ordered that
Fitzgerald be fired.
It was not until 1978 that Fitzgerald sued
Richard Nixon for violation of his civil rights.
Nixon moved to dismiss, but the U.S. District Court
ordered that the suit go to trial. In the end, the
Supreme Court reversed and held that "as a former
president of the United States, Mr. Nixon is entitled
to absolute immunity from damages predicated on
his official acts."
The facts in the Fitzgerald case bear small
resemblance to the facts in Jones vs. Clinton. At the
time of the high court's 1982 decree in the
Fitzgerald case, Richard Nixon was long gone from
the Oval Office; Bill Clinton is still very much on
hand. Fitzgerald's suit rested in Nixon's official acts
as president; Paula Jones' suit hinges on Clinton's
unofficial acts as governor of Arkansas.
Justice Lewis Powell warned in the Fitzgerald
case against diverting a president's energies by
involving him in private lawsuits. Chief Justice
Warren Burger, concurring, argued that the
fundamental principle of separation of powers
should be preserved. None of the three branches
must be able to control, intimidate or interfere with
another branch. It is a valid concern.
That concern should control the high court's
decision in Mrs. Jones' suit against the president.
Clinton is not seeking flat-out dismissal of the suit.
He asks only that trial be deferred until after he
ceases to hold the Oval Office.
Does that request put him "above the law"? Not
at all. Such deferrals are commonplace in our civil
courts. This, too, should be remembered: Mrs. Jones
is in a weak position to demand that the case be
-accelerated. She waited until May 6, 1994, to bring
her suit - precisely two days before the three-year
statute of limitations would toll.
No one is suggesting that Clinton is "immune"
from suit for his unofficial acts as governor of
Arkansas. As the 8th Circuit observed, the
Constitution "did not create a monarchy." Bill
Clinton puts on his pants (or takes them off, as the
case may be) just as other men do. If Mrs. Jones can
prove her scandalous charges, she could take the
president for a bundle. Fine with me.
But not while he bears the awesome
responsibilities of the high office he holds. A sitting
president simply cannot be made subject to the
commands of a trial judge. Damage suits have a way
of driving every other matter out of one's mind.
Maybe the trial judge would be sensitive to the
demands of the president's schedule. Then again,
maybe not.
It is the precedent that counts. Sitting presidents
should not be held immune from suit for their
private transgressions, but they must be immune
from civil trial while in office.
One more thing: Some confusion has arisen
over the president's role as commander in chief. In
his petition for Supreme Court review, Clinton's
lead counsel, Robert S. Bennett, inserted a
makeweight argument. It was a dumb thing to do.
He said:
"There are numerous instances where civil
plaintiffs are required to accept the temporary
postponement of litigation so that important
institutional or public interests can be protected.
For example, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act provides that civil claims by or
against military personnel are to be tolled and
stayed while they are on active duty. Such relief
is deemed necessary to enable members of the
armed forces "to devote their entire energy to
the defense needs of the nation.' President
Clinton here thus seeks relief similar to that to
which he may be entitled as commander in chief
of the armed forces, and which is routinely
available to service members under his
command."
This is piffle, but forget it. The important thing
is to keep judges out of the Oval Office while a
president is sitting there.
Distributed by Universal Press Syndicate.
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CLINTON REVISES CASE FOR DELAY OF LAWSUIT
New High Court Brief Clarifies Earlier Citation of Soldiers' Law
The Washington Post
Wednesday, May 29, 1996
Ann Devroy; Ruth Marcus, Staff Writers
President Clinton's lawyers, trying to quell a
week-long controversy over his legal argument in a
sexual harassment suit, yesterday filed a new brief
explaining that Clinton is not relying on his status as
commander in chief to postpone the case.
Clinton attorney Robert S. Bennett said
yesterday that Republicans had made a "grotesque
and disgracefl distortion" of his argument at the
Supreme Court that a sexual harassment lawsuit by
Paula Corbin Jones should be delayed until Clinton
leaves office.
Bennett's original brief included language
suggesting that the president, as commander in
chief, might be covered by a law shielding active
duty military personnel from being sued.
Republicans seized the opportunity to raise two
issues highly embarrassing to Clinton: questions
about his alleged womanizing and about his efforts
to avoid the draft during the Vietnam War. With the
Memorial Day holiday weekend on the horizon, they
charged that Clinton was trying to duck the sexual
harassment suit in an election year by claiming a
prerogative of an active-duty military officer.
Yesterday's filing was in part an effort at
damage control. White House officials privately
made clear that the ferocity of the public response to
the Supreme Court brief had taken them by surprise
and that they viewed Bennett's original language, as
one senior official put it, as "politically inartful."
Bennett was to file a "reply brief" at the high
court in any case. He used yesterday's brief as an
opportunity to clarify his earlier argument and, the
White House hopes, put the political controversy to
rest.
The brief repeats what the White House and
Bennett have said all along -- that Clinton is not
relying on the military issue in seeking a delay but
rather contending that postponement is warranted by
the constitutional principle of separation of powers
and Clinton's unique role as president. In the
original brief, Bennett argued that lengthy delays in
civil lawsuits are not extraordinary. Among the
"numerous instances" of such delays cited by
Bennett is the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of 1940, which provides that some lawsuits against
service members must be postponed until they leave
active duty. "President Clinton here thus seeks relief
similar to that to which he may be entitled as
Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces, and
which is routinely available to service members
under his command," Bennett wrote.
In a footnote in yesterday's filing, Bennett said
he was not arguing that Clinton was covered by the
law. "The President does not rely on, or claim any
relief under, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief
Act of 1940 or any other legislation," he said.
The controversy over the brief illustrates the
potentially volatile mixture of law and politics in an
election year, when otherwise routine legal
arguments can be transformed into political land
mines.
Both Bennett and the Justice Department had
used the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act to buttress
their legal arguments in the lower courts.
Bennett noted in earlier court filings, for
example, that President John F. Kennedy contended
he was covered by the law in seeking dismissal of a
case against him and said it was "arguable" that the
law applied to Clinton, although he was not relying
on it.
The Justice Department, calling the law
"instructive," said the "public interest
considerations" underlying it "apply with far greater
force to a civil action that threatens to impair the
attention to duty of the President, who is the
Commander in Chief."
But the appearance of the argument in a
Supreme Court brief six months before the
presidential election proved explosive. Jones's
lawyer, Joseph Cammarata, said yesterday that,
although he thought Bennett's original Supreme
Court filing "pushed it [the argument] a step further,
we're just amazed that it's sort of taken off here.
These arguments . .. have been made for two years."
The Republican National Committee produced
a television ad ridiculing Clinton on the issue;
veterans groups held news conferences questioning
the presidential use of the issue; and, over the
weekend, a group of five Medal of Honor recipients
took out full-page ads in some newspapers calling
on Clinton to renounce the argument. Virtually all
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the attacks made reference to Clinton's avoidance of
the draft during the Vietnam War. The RNC ad,
heavily aired for the media, made its way onto
weekend news shows but never appeared as a paid
ad over the holiday weekend.
Jones, a former Arkansas state employee,
alleges in her lawsuit that Clinton lewdly
propositioned her in a Little Rock hotel suite in
1991 when he was governor of Arkansas. Clinton
has denied the allegation.
A federal appeals court rejected Clinton's effort
to postpone the case. The issue of whether to
proceed with the case or grant the delay is before the
Supreme Court.
Bennett said the GOP had "scored some
short-term political points" in what he called
"distortions" of his brief. Bristling at the suggestion
Clinton's political interests might have been better
served without the reference, Bennett said, "Look,
when you write a brief for the United States
Supreme Court you don't filter them through a
pollster first to see how they fly."
Exactly how the language appeared and whether
there was a political vetting of it was the subject of
some dispute yesterday. White House press
secretary Michael McCurry said Clinton had not
seen the brief before it was filed. Other sources said
the White House counsel's office and the solicitor
general's office had approved the use of the soldiers'
and sailors' law.
But a Justice Department source said the
solicitor general's office had no role in approving a
brief filed by a private lawyer and had not seen a
final copy containing the controversial sentence.
Asked yesterday whether there had been a
- political blunder, McGurry said, "Sure, we maybe
should have predicted the Republicans would go out
and run ads and misconstrue the nature of the
president's brief."
The RNC said that since Bennett had amended
his argument, it would pull the Jones ad and use a
balanced budget spot.
"Let me get this straight," RNC Chairman
Haley Barbour said. "Clinton never relied on the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act to postpone the
sexual harassment suit, and to prove it he is
rewriting the brief to take out the part that he never
relied on in the first place. That's vintage Bill
Clinton."
Copyright 1996 The Washington Post
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CLINTON WON'T FACE JONES SUIT BEFORE ELECTION
High Court Will Rule on Timing In '97
The Washington Times
Tuesday, June 25, 1996
Frank J. Murray
President Clinton won a Supreme Court
reprieve yesterday from having to face politically
embarrassing testimony about sexual-harassment
charges during his re-election campaign.
The court voted to hear the president's appeal -
probably in January, just before Inauguration Day -
and thus put Paula Corbin Jones' sexual-misconduct
lawsuit on ice well into the next presidency, with no
decision likely until May or June.
Mrs. Jones responded by calling the president
a "coward" for ducking a showdown on charges the
president calls baseless.
"They lost their political leverage today, and I'm
pleased this case will ultimately be decided on a
legal basis," Clinton attorney Robert S. Bennett said
in an interview. "I think from the beginning this
case was very much connected with an effort to
discredit the president."
He called the case "largely, not exclusively, an
effort to embarrass the president politically," noting
that the charges first emerged in a political forum
and that Mrs. Jones' lead attorney has mentioned
his role in the case while campaigning for next
year's GOP nomination for Virginia attorney
general.
Lawyer Gilbert K Davis scoffed at the idea his
Republican activism in Fairfax County means the
case against the Democratic president is politically
motivated. He said there is a real need "with this
group" to protect documents from loss or
destruction.
He said depositions and other disclosures in the
case could have started immediately if the justices
had not deferred to claims by Mr. Clinton and
Solicitor General Drew S. Days III that the
president's "unique responsibilities" justify a delay.
Mr. Clinton's "worst nightmare would be that
he had to have a deposition in this case," Mr. Davis
said. "He knows what he did. It was an assault, if
Paula Jones is correct about what happened .. . and
I think that could have hurt him.... "
"It might have helped the Republicans in some
fashion for us to be taking depositions in this
season, but that's for somebody else to decide."
The president's earlier delays in the case
dictated the timing, Mr. Davis said.
Apparently frustrated by the latest
postponement, Mrs. Jones lashed out at the
president, said one of her attorneys, Joseph
Cammarata.
"She feels that the president is a coward," he
said at a news conference. "That was her word -
those were her words."
After leaming of the high court's decision, Mrs.
Jones said: 'Why is he running? Why is he seeking
to avoid personal accountability?"
White House spokesman Michael McCurry said
the president heard the decision in Nashville, Tenn.,
and welcomed it.
"The White House is pleased that the court has
recognized the merits in the petition put forward by
the president's attorneys," Mr. McCurry said.
Mrs. Jones seeks $700,000 in a lawsuit
centering on accusations that as an Arkansas state
employee her civil rights were violated in 1991
when the goveror exposed himself and made sexual
suggestions after she was escorted to his hotel suite
by state Trooper Danny Ferguson, also named in the
suit.
She identified herself as the "Paula" in a 1993
American Spectator article based on interviews with
Trooper Ferguson and other troopers about sexual
exploits of the governor they protected.
The four-count suit says the episode caused
emotional distress and says she was defamed by a
White House spokesman and a presidential lawyer
who denied Mr. Clinton was involved.
Federal appeals courts ruled against Mr.
Clinton's request that testimony and trial be delayed
until he leaves office. But at least four Supreme
Court justices agreed to consider his contention he
should not be the first chief executive to face a
private lawsuit while in office for conduct before his
election.
Suits against President Kennedy for a campaign
traffic accident, President Truman for a psychiatric
commitment he ordered as a Missouri judge and
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President Theodore Roosevelt for a personnel action
as New York police commissioner were ended
without forcing them into court.
"Delaying the trial until Mr. Clinton is no
longer president is the functional equivalent of a
grant of temporary immunity to which, as we hold
today, Mr. Clinton is not constitutionally entitled,"
the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled.
'We hold that the Constitution does not confer
upon an incumbent president any immunity from
civil actions that arise from his unofficial acts," it
said, directing the trial judge to manage the case to
avoid interfering with official duties.
Mr. Bennett claimed that Mr. Clinton's unique
job is too important to subject him to civil lawsuits
while in office "in all but the most exceptional
cases" and that important constitutional questions
regarding separation of powers would arise from a
judge's decision on scheduling.
In citing examples of laws that permit delays for
public-policy reasons, Mr. Bennett ignited a
political firestorm by suggesting Mr. Clinton could,
as commander in chief be eligible for postponement
as an active-duty member of the military he avoided
entering during the Vietnam War.
THE PAULA JONES CASE HISTORY
Key dates in the federal lawsuit charging Bill
Clinton infringed Paula Corbin Jones' civil rights by
sexually harassing the Arkansas state employee
while he was governor:
May 8, 1991 - At the Governor's Quality
Management Conference at the Excelsior Hotel in
Little Rock, Trooper Danny Ferguson tells Miss
Corbin, who is not yet married, that the governor
wants to meet with her in his suite. After she arrives
there, she said, the governor makes verbal and
physical sexual advances, including exposing
himself.
Dec. 20, 1993 - The American Spectator
quotes troopers regarding the incident involving
"Paula' and Mr. Clinton, implying a sexual
relationship between them.
May 6, 1994 -Mrs. Jones sues the president on
two counts of violating her civil rights, one for
causing emotional distress and one for defamation.
She asks $175,000 on each count.
June 10, 1994 - Trooper Ferguson says he
accompanied her in an elevator and pointed out the
governor's suite but denies knowledge of events
inside.
Dec. 28, 1994 - A federal judge grants Mr.
Clinton's motion to delay trial while he is president
but orders discovery and depositions to proceed.
Jan. 9, 1996 - The 8th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals denies Mr. Clinton's immunity claim and
orders the trial judge to proceed.
Yesterday - The U.S. Supreme Court agrees to
decide the issue, thus putting the trial on hold.
Copyright 1996 The Washington Times
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